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[1661] 
In and Out—Contract Doctrines in Action 
Danielle Kie Hart* 
This Article was written to test a hypothesis, namely, that it is easy to get into a contract 
but very difficult to get out of one. After reviewing case law from the Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits, contract law in action suggests that reality may be slightly different from theory. 
That is, the data from the cases show that it may not be so easy to get into a contract in 
practice, but it is extremely difficult to get out of one. Pacta sunt servanda seems to be 
alive and well in twenty-first century contract law. Perhaps the more significant finding 
from the cases, however, is that the party with more bargaining power tends to get the 
outcome that it wants in a given case, regardless of its preferred outcome. The 
implications of this finding are unsettling to say the least, in large part because it is so 
difficult to get out of a contract once it is formed. More specifically, misuse of unequal 
bargaining power by the stronger party during formation of the contract will likely go 
unchecked, the weaker party will be locked into whatever bargain is made, and the 
stronger party will get to keep even “ill-gotten gains,” so to speak, because the contract 
and all of its terms (both reasonable and unreasonable) will be binding. Any solution to 
the problems confronting contract law, therefore, will have to address bargaining power 
directly and effectively, which is by no means an easy task as the Home Affordable 
Mortgage Program reveals. Nevertheless, this task is one worth undertaking given that 
any discussion of contract law is, at least in part, also a discussion of contract law’s place 
within the American legal system and that system’s role in helping us to live up to our 
individual and collective aspirations. 
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Introduction 
It is very easy to enter into a contract but extremely difficult to get 
out of one. I have said as much in several different places.1 If asked prior 
to researching and writing this paper, I would have said that this easy 
in/difficult out structure of contract law was an established part of the 
contract law canon. After searching for some time, however, I discovered 
that no one besides me has actually come out and made this claim 
explicitly. I primarily blame Charles Knapp for this omission, because so 
much of his work has informed mine. 
Charles Knapp is a professor of contract law,2 which means that he 
teaches, writes, and thinks about the law of contracts; and he has devoted 
himself to this role for the past fifty years. Countless students have 
passed through Professor Knapp’s classroom and he has produced a 
prodigious as well as influential body of scholarship. Knapp’s work 
sometimes focuses on specific doctrines, like unconscionability3 and 
promissory estoppel.4 But in other instances, he has turned his attention 
to understanding and analyzing the evolution of contract law and its 
implications for modern society.5 Regardless of the content, his work is 
always firmly grounded in contract law doctrines and case law.6 Armed 
with this knowledge of what the courts are actually doing, Knapp has 
 
 1. See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 Loy. U. 
Chi. L.J. 175, 202–16 (2009) [hereinafter Hart, Formation]; Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—
Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. Balt. L. Rev. 1, 9–21 (2011) [hereinafter Hart, Reality]. 
 2. Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71 
Fordham L. Rev. 761, 761 (2002). 
 3. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability 
as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609, 610 (2009). 
 4. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 Hastings 
L.J. 1191, 1192 (1998). 
 5. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of 
Individual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95, 97 (2006–2007); Knapp,, supra note 2, at 762–64. 
 6. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 4, at 1193–1203; Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the 
Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 12 Nev. L. J. 553, 555–61 (2012). 
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consistently, and often presciently, identified troubling trends and 
problematic issues that call for careful attention, like the ever-increasing 
deference courts give to the drafters of contracts and the vanishing 
requirement of mutual assent.7 Through it all, his concern for the effect 
that contract law in action has on the weaker contracting party is evident 
and purposeful.8 
If imitation is the best form of flattery, then this Article should do 
the trick because in this piece I plan to shamelessly copy Knapp, both in 
terms of substance and format. In terms of substance, I, like him, will 
evaluate the state of contract law, concentrating here on contract law in 
the twenty-first century. In terms of format, I will use the Dickensian 
scheme from A Christmas Carol, which Knapp has employed so well in at 
least a couple of his articles.9 
Thus, Part I will look at where contract law has been by examining 
Knapp’s work, focusing particularly on his assertions that contract law 
defers too much to the document itself and to the drafters of contracts.10 
He argues, in essence, that because contract law privileges written 
agreements, drafters of contracts can (and do) include a lot of one-sided 
terms into their contracts, and then end up getting to keep them because 
contract law makes those agreements binding.11 Implicit in these 
assertions is the claim that contracts are very easy to get into but 
extremely difficult to get out of. 
Part II will then analyze case law from trial and appellate courts in 
the states within the jurisdiction of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits to 
determine whether the easy in/difficult out claim is accurate. The data 
from the case law reveal two significant findings. First, the data indicate 
that part of the easy in/difficult out hypothesis may not be true. 
Specifically, it may not be so easy to get into a contract—a contract was 
not actually formed in more than half of the reviewed cases. That said, the 
other part of the hypothesis, namely, that, once in, it is extremely difficult 
to get out of a contract is solidly supported by the reviewed cases. The 
second significant finding from the data is that the party with more 
bargaining power generally gets the outcome that it wants in a given 
case, whether the preferred outcome is that a contract was formed or not 
formed, or a duty was discharged or not discharged. Home loan 
modifications are used as a specific and problematic example of this 
phenomenon. In light of the data collected in Part II, Part III will 
examine the future of contract law by considering the implications of a 
 
 7. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 5, at 102–04, 112–14; Knapp, supra note 2, at 770–76. 
 8. See Knapp, supra note 5, at 119–35 (arguing that contract law for individual contracts is 
inadequate and making specific suggestions to remedy it). 
 9. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 2, at 790; Charles L. Knapp, The Promise of the Future—And Vice 
Versa: Some Reflections on the Metamorphosis of Contract Law, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 932, 951–52 (1984). 
 10. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 5, at 102–04, 112–14. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 102–04, 112–14. 
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contracting reality that may privilege parties with more bargaining power 
and which definitely locks people into their contracts. 
I.  Easy In/Difficult Out—The Theory 
To be fair, Knapp does not come right out and say that it is easy to 
get into a contract but very hard to get out of one—though he has come 
close. For example, in an early article, he discussed a trend in the cases 
that suggested a greater willingness by courts to impose contractual 
liability, even where offer and acceptance were not easily identifiable, by 
relying instead on the parties’ “intention to be bound.”12 He has also 
noted on different occasions that there is a distinct “judicial 
disinclination to allow equitable defenses,”13 like unconscionability,14 
which of course means that it is much harder for a party who no longer 
wants to perform to avoid having to do so. 
By and large, this easy in/difficult out claim that I take from his work 
is more implicit than explicit in Knapp’s writing. Knapp has consistently 
questioned, for example, whether the doctrine of mutual assent is still 
viable in contract law.15 In fact, he has argued that mutual assent is either 
non-existent, as in the case of blanket unilateral contract modifications,16 
or simply meaningless, as in the case of “rolling contracts.”17 Since 
mutual assent is still recognized as one of two elements necessary to form 
a valid contract,18 it necessarily follows that making mutual assent easier 
to establish makes it easier to get into a contract. 
Knapp’s concerns about mutual assent are brought into particularly 
sharp focus in the context of his discussions of adhesion contracts in both 
actual and virtual reality.19 Briefly, an adhesion contract is a contract 
usually characterized by a standard form drafted by the party with more 
bargaining power (the stronger party) and presented to the other 
(weaker) party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with certain exceptions for 
things like price, quantity, and time and place of delivery.20 According to 
Knapp, adhesion contracts epitomize contract law’s deference to both the 
contract document itself and the drafters of such contracts.21 
Given this combination of factors—a standard form drafted by the 
stronger contracting party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—two things 
 
 12. Knapp, supra note 9, at 938. 
 13. Knapp, supra note 2, at 767. 
 14. See Knapp, supra note 5, at 102. 
 15. Knapp, supra note 6, at 561–62. 
 16. Knapp, supra note 5, at 114. 
 17. Id. at 112. “Rolling contracts” are contracting situations in which buyers of goods or services 
have reason to know that additional terms will be forthcoming. 
 18. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17(1) (1981). 
 19. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 5, at 111–13; Knapp, supra note 2, at 769–70, 775. 
 20. Knapp, supra note 2, at 769–70. 
 21. See Knapp, supra note 5, at 100–04; Knapp, supra note 2, at 767, 775–76. 
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happen. First, the weaker (or adhering) party typically has no real say or 
choice with respect to the terms that end up in the contract.22 Second, and 
as a direct result of the first point, the drafters of these contracts include 
more and more one-sided terms in the agreement, that is, terms that 
favor them in any contract dispute whether at the negotiation or 
litigation stage. Knapp singles out mandatory arbitration, choice of 
forum, and choice of law provisions as particularly worrisome contract 
terms.23 Arbitration provisions remove the contract case out of court 
altogether.24 But should the case manage to get into court, choice of 
forum clauses force potential litigants to litigate the case in forums 
usually inconvenient to them, while choice of law terms generally ensure 
that the law used to decide the case will be more favorable to the drafting 
party.25 
To further complicate matters, Knapp reminds us that under 
existing contract law, the drafters of these adhesive documents not only 
get to include the terms that they want in the agreements, they generally 
get to keep them because of the deference contract law gives to the 
document. Knapp focuses here on doctrines, rules, and clauses like the 
“duty to read,”26 the “plain meaning rule” to contract interpretation,27 the 
“four corners” approach to the parol evidence rule,28 and no oral 
modification clauses.29 
Together all of these legal devices—the evisceration of the element 
of mutual assent, the deference that contract law pays to both the drafters 
of contracts and the documents themselves, and the judicial disinclination 
to permit equitable defenses—essentially ensure that anyone who signs 
(or otherwise assents to) a written contract will be bound by that contract 
 
 22. Knapp, supra note 2, at 770. 
 23. Knapp, supra note 5, at 116–18. 
 24. Knapp, supra note 2, at 775; Knapp, supra note 5, at 117–18. 
 25. Knapp, supra note 2, at 775; Knapp, supra note 5, at 116–17. 
 26. See, e.g., Rossi v. Douglas, 100 A.2d 3, 7 (1953) (stating “ it is well established that . . . one 
having the capacity to understand a written document who reads it, or, without reading it or having it 
read to him, signs it, is bound by his signature”). The duty to read applies even in the absence of a 
signature. See Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari & Perillo on Contracts § 9.41, at 342 (6th ed. 2009); 
Knapp, supra note 2, at 767; Knapp, supra note 5, at 102. For a more recent endorsement of the duty 
to read, see Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1060 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
 27. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.12, at 476 (3d ed. 1999) (“The essence of a plain 
meaning rule is that there are some instances in which the meaning of language, when taken in 
context, is so clear that evidence of prior negotiations cannot be used in its interpretation.”); see also 
Knapp, supra note 2, at 767. 
 28. The four corners rule is one under which a court looks only at the writing itself to determine 
its level of integration. Farnsworth, supra note 27, at 477; Jeffrey Ferriell & Michael Navin 
Understanding Contracts § 6.05[B][3], at 346 (2014). See Knapp, supra note 2, at 767. 
 29. A “no oral modification clause” is a clause included in a contract for the specific purpose of 
precluding oral modifications to the agreement. Farnsworth, supra note 27, at 449. See Knapp, supra 
note 5, at 101. 
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and all of its terms.30 In short, it is very easy to get into a contract but 
very hard to get out of one. 
Knapp, of course, is not alone in implying that the easy in/difficult 
out paradigm exists in contract law. Professor Nancy Kim makes very 
similar arguments in the context of online contracts like browse-wrap 
and click-wrap agreements.31 She argues, for example, that because 
online contracts are adhesive and digital in form, it is almost costless to the 
drafters to include more and more one-sided terms in the agreements.32 In 
fact, they consistently do so because the practice imposes virtually no 
reputational costs.33 Kim also argues that the drafters of online contracts 
not only get to include the terms that they want in these contracts, they 
also get to keep them.34 This is primarily because the version of blanket 
assent that courts employ with online contracts satisfies the mutual 
assent element of contract formation.35 Courts have thus used online 
blanket assent to conclude that the non-drafting party has assented to all 
of the terms of the online contract and to uphold the validity of these 
contracts.36 
Knapp and Kim’s approaches to contract formation are consistent 
with the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. According to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, “[a] contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy[.]”37 In other words, a contract is a contract 
if the law says it is. And under both the Restatement and Article 2, 
forming a contract definitely looks easy. Both “Article 2 and the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts recognize that a contract can be 
formed by words or conduct and even if the exact moment of mutual 
assent cannot be identified or is delayed, and the contract lacks material 
terms.”38 
Finally, while there is not a lot of empirical work on the issue, the 
work that does exist supports the claim that it is very difficult to get out 
 
 30. Knapp, supra note 2, at 767; Knapp, supra note 5, at 102. 
 31. See Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts 39–43 (2013). 
 32. Id. at 58. 
 33. Id. at 51. 
 34. Id. at 61–62. 
 35. “Blanket assent” means that the party assenting to the online contract is presumed to have 
actually assented to all of the bargained-for terms in the contract and given her blanket assent to any 
terms that are not unreasonable or indecent. Id. at 62–63. The problem is that courts have held that 
“notice of notice,” where the browsing party is simply shown a hyperlink that would take her to the 
terms of the contract if clicked on, is enough to signify consent. Therefore, a valid contract would be 
formed through the online version of blanket assent. Id. at 130, 134.  
 36. Id. at 35–43, 62–69. 
 37. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (1981). 
 38. Hart, Formation, supra note 1, at 203 (citations omitted). 
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of a contract.39 Putting everything together therefore supports the 
supposition that it is easy to get into a contract but difficult to get out of 
one, at least in theory. 
II.  Contract Law in Practice—The Cases 
While there is clearly support for the easy in/difficult out theory, it 
remains an open question whether the theory holds true in practice. This 
Part of the Article, therefore, tests this theory in contract law cases from 
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Part A sets forth the methods used to 
collect the cases for the Article. Part B then lays out the data in a series 
of tables and reports the results. The data reveal that: (1) it may not be as 
easy to get into a contract as the theory might otherwise suggest; (2) it is, 
however, extremely difficult to get out of a contract; and (3) the party 
with more bargaining power generally gets the outcome that it wants 
regardless of what might be its preferred outcome in a given case (for 
example, whether a contract was formed, or whether a duty was 
discharged). 
Part C uses home loan modifications to explore the phenomenon 
suggested by the cases, namely, that contract law may privilege the party 
with more bargaining power. As it turns out, the stronger party (here the 
banks), did get the outcome that they wanted more often than not, for 
example, no home loan modifications. This was the case both before and 
after Congress enacted the Home Affordable Mortgage Program 
(“HAMP”) in 2009. One reason for this result seems to be a rigid 
adherence by courts, even in the face of contrary regulations, to 
upholding freedom of contract. Part D concludes by arguing that 
freedom of contract is a myth, one that has potentially devastating 
consequences for weaker contracting parties. 
A. Methods 
The easy in part of the theory that I ascribe primarily to Knapp 
centers on Knapp’s critique of mutual assent. Though there is some 
dispute,40 mutual assent is still ordinarily formed via offer and 
 
 39. Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1067, 1097 (2006) (“Data revealed that in 
only 37.8% (56 out of 148) of the cases sampled unconscionability was found.”); Grace M. Giesel, A 
Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. Va. L. Rev. 443, 463–64 (2005) (“[I]n only 
nine of the eighty-eight [duress] cases [examined] did the court decide the matter in favor of the duress 
claim”). Of those nine cases, an appellate court affirmed a lower court’s finding of duress in only two 
cases. Id.  
 40. See Shawn J. Bayern, Offer and Acceptance in Modern Contract Law: A Needless Concept, 103 
Calif. L. Rev. 67, 68 (2015) (criticizing the offer-and-acceptance paradigm in modern contracting 
practice). 
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acceptance.41 In addition, the judicial disinclination to allow people to get 
out of their contracts is premised on whether defenses, equitable or 
otherwise, are successful. To test the easy in/difficult out theory, therefore, 
the case law research for this Article focuses on specific contract law 
doctrines. 
A total of 189 trial and appellate cases from the federal and state 
courts within the jurisdiction of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits were 
collected for this Article.42 The doctrines surveyed include: offer, 
acceptance, modification, duress, and impracticability of performance.43 
The research was conducted in the following four steps: 
(1) Selecting the Jurisdictions. The Ninth Circuit was selected 
because it is the largest of the thirteen courts of appeal and therefore 
likely to generate more contracts cases than other circuits. It also has a 
reputation for being consumer friendly.44 The Seventh Circuit was 
selected primarily because of its association with the Law and 
Economics approach and its reputation for being less consumer friendly.45 
(2) The Searches. Each search was conducted on Lexis using the 
timeline of January 1, 2000 through March 1, 2014 applying the 
jurisdictional filters and search terms specified below:  
 
 41. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22(1) (1981); see also Claude D. Rohwer & 
Anthony M. Skrocki, Contracts in a Nutshell § 1.2, at 4 (6th ed. 2006) (“Realizing that one may 
not be able to find a specific offer and acceptance in every contract relationship that comes into 
existence, it is nonetheless easier to approach the concept of contract formation by focusing upon the 
basic elements involved in the offer and acceptance interchange.”). 
 42. See Appendix 1 for a complete list of the cases. 
 43. Offer and acceptance were selected because together they form mutual assent. Mutual assent 
is one of two elements necessary to form a valid contract. Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 17(1) (1981). Offer and acceptance were therefore selected because they specifically focus on 
contract formation. Duress and impracticability of performance were selected because they are both 
contract defenses that would justify nonperformance of a contract. That is, either doctrine would 
enable a party to get out of a contract. Duress was selected because it is triggered by bargaining 
misbehavior that resulted in contract formation. Impracticability of performance, in contrast, is 
triggered by changed circumstances occurring after contract formation that adversely affect one 
party’s ability to perform the contract. Modification was selected because it straddles formation and 
performance—it is both an out and an in. More specifically, a modification permits a party to get out 
of performing a contract duty by substituting a modified obligation for the original duty. But a 
modification is itself a contract that generally must satisfy the contract formation requirements and, 
therefore, presents a separate opportunity to form a contract. Thus, to get out of a contract duty one 
must first get into a new contract. 
 44. See, e.g., Mark Walsh, A Sixth Sense: The 6th Circuit Has Surpassed the 9th as the Most 
Reversed Appeals Court, 98 A.B.A. J. 15, 15 (2012) (noting that “Conservatives decry the 9th Circuit’s 
perceived liberal bent”); see also Josh Schwartz, ‘Liberal’ Reputation Precedes 9th Circuit Court, N.Y. 
Times (Apr. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/25/us/25sfninth.html. 
 45. Cf. Ian Millhiser, Marriage Equality Supporters Just Won the Lottery in A Federal Appeals Court, 
ThinkProgress.org (Aug. 26, 2014, 9:43 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/08/26/3475687/marriage-
equality-supporters-just-won-the-lottery-in-a-federal-appeal-court/ (“The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit is a very conservative court.”). 
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(a) Jurisdictional Filters.  
(i) Seventh Circuit—Jurisdiction: Seventh Circuit, Illinois, 
Indiana, Wisconsin. 
(ii) Ninth Circuit—Jurisdiction: Ninth Circuit, Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, 
Oregon, Washington. 
(b) Search Terms. 
(i) Offer: (“an offer” near/2 exist!) or (“constitute an offer”); 
(ii) Acceptance: (unequiv! near/3 accept!) or (valid near/3 
accept!);46  
(iii) Modification: contract and modif! /s valid! or modif! /s 
form!;47 
(iv) Duress: duress /p contract and avoid! /p enforce!; and 
(v) Impracticability of Performance: (impract! near/25 
perform!) and (perform! near /25 contract). 
(3) Screening the Cases. The searches pulled up a lot of cases—
1076 for the Seventh Circuit and 3088 for the Ninth Circuit. Each case 
was screened to make sure that it was on point, meaning, that the case 
actually addressed the contract law doctrine being surveyed and 
decided some part of the case based on that doctrine. Only cases that 
were on point were selected for substantive review. 
 
 46. By confining the key words to “offer” and “acceptance” in the searches conducted for this 
article, it is entirely possible that the searches missed many paradigmatic easy in cases where the issue 
is not whether an offer was made or accepted but whether a party manifested assent. Assent in the 
context of a browse-wrap contract would be a prototypical example of this kind of case. See generally 
Kim, supra note 31, at 3443, 6269, 130, 134. I made the decision to focus on offer and acceptance for 
two reasons. First, I wanted to study specific contract law doctrines to see how the courts are using 
them. Second, I wanted to test whether the easy in theory could be established outside of the 
prototypical cases that involve questions of mutual assent more generally. 
 47. The original modification searches yielded a large number of cases. As a result, I used a 
random number generator to generate 100 random numbers from within the original total yield, i.e., 
between 1 and 756 (for the Seventh Circuit) and between 1 and 2181 (for the Ninth Circuit). I then put 
the random numbers generated into chronological order, sorted the cases on Lexis from oldest to 
newest, and screened the cases in that order. The random numbers generated for the Seventh Circuit 
in chronological order are: 2, 9, 24, 26, 30, 35, 50, 54, 70, 80, 87, 93, 98, 101, 114, 121, 125, 140, 145, 146, 
150, 152, 167, 169, 174, 181, 184, 188, 193, 196, 210, 217, 229, 233, 237, 238, 261, 273, 294, 301, 307, 309, 
313, 315, 316, 325, 332, 337, 346, 352, 376, 390, 391, 394, 401, 403, 415, 417, 419, 449, 451, 458, 465, 482, 
487, 491, 495, 502, 508, 523, 529, 531, 556, 561, 565, 566, 567, 570, 588, 602, 605, 608, 624, 635, 636, 642, 
657, 666, 676, 686, 687, 702, 703, 708, 721, 731, 737, 741, 746, 755. The random numbers generated for 
the Ninth Circuit in chronological order are: 2, 8, 17, 32, 58, 68, 70, 75, 84, 101, 154, 169, 180, 189, 196, 
207, 222, 259, 269, 282, 301, 320, 322, 340, 367, 399, 468, 499, 531, 581, 620, 623, 631, 683, 719, 724, 752, 
771, 786, 800, 864, 866, 909, 912, 921, 930, 937, 969, 1063, 1067, 1069, 1086, 1117, 1154, 1155, 1162, 1169, 
1200, 1215, 1229, 1256, 1260, 1287, 1302, 1304, 1318, 1322, 1372, 1426, 1462, 1483, 1502, 1548, 1562, 
1574, 1608, 1699, 1740, 1762, 1831, 1853, 1865, 1872, 1874, 1926, 1927, 1980, 1999, 2033, 2049, 2052, 
2067, 2078, 2087, 2104, 2122, 2157, 2168, 2169, 2173. Screening in this fashion only yielded 3 cases for 
the Seventh Circuit and 5 cases for the Ninth Circuit. I therefore re-sorted the cases on Lexis based on 
relevance and kept the first 22 and 20 cases, respectively, that addressed/discussed modification in 
detail for a total of 25 modification cases in each circuit. Substantive review of the cases then yielded 
the numbers listed in Appendix 1. The random number generator I used is here: 
http://www.randomnumberpicker.com/advanced-random-number-generator. 
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(4) Substantive Review of the Cases. Each of the selected cases was 
read to ensure, first, that it did in fact address and decide the contract law 
doctrine at issue.48 On occasion, the substantive review of a case revealed 
that the case decided an issue involving more than one doctrine, for 
example, both offer and acceptance. In this situation, the case was selected 
for both doctrines. It also happened on occasion that a case being reviewed 
for one doctrine, for example offer, actually focused more on another 
doctrine, like acceptance. In these circumstances, the case was added to 
the selected cases for the other doctrine notwithstanding that the case did 
not appear in the search conducted for that doctrine. 
Therefore, in the end the case screening and review process 
captured a total of 87 cases for the Seventh Circuit and 102 cases for the 
Ninth Circuit.49 Table 1 provides a summary of the captured cases in each 
circuit by substantive category. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Captured Cases by Substantive Category50 
Claim Category 7th Circuit 9th Circuit 
Real Property 21 44 
Employment 10 12 
Sale of Goods 9 8 
Insurance 7 3 
Construction 3 1 
Credit Cards 1 2 
Torts/Personal Injury 0 6 
Software/IP 0 5 
Family 2 0 
Arbitration 1 0 
Miscellaneous Services 14 11 
Other 19 10 
Totals 87 102 
 
To be clear, the goal of this project was not to collect all of the cases 
in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits associated with the doctrines being 
surveyed. Rather, the goal of the project was to define a large enough 
sample in which all of the captured cases are on point (i.e., they are cases 
that actually decide issues associated with the doctrines surveyed). 
Collectively, therefore, all of the cases included in this Article provide a 
 
 48. “Deciding” the contract law doctrine includes motions to dismiss and motions for summary 
judgment that were granted with no subsequent negative appellate history and/or affirmed on appeal. 
Though rare, cases that decided the contract law issue as a matter of law on a motion to dismiss or on 
summary judgment that was ultimately reversed were also included, as were cases that went to final 
judgment. 
 49. See Appendix 1 for a list of all the cases by circuits and doctrines. 
 50. See Appendix 2 for a list of all the cases in Table 1. 
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snapshot of how contract law doctrine is being decided and shaped in two 
different circuits in the twenty-first century. 
Finally, all captured cases were mined for certain pieces of data, 
including, but not limited to: the subject matter of the case (i.e., real 
property, insurance, employment, etc.); the procedural posture (i.e., a 
motion for summary judgment, appeal from a final judgment, etc.); which 
party raised the doctrine and for what purpose (i.e., to rescind a contract, 
to discharge performance, establish a contract, etc.); and which party 
prevailed with respect to the doctrine (i.e., which party got the outcome 
it wanted in the case).  
I also identified which party was stronger and which was weaker in 
terms of relative bargaining power. To make this assessment, I looked 
for conventional indicia of bargaining power.51 These include property 
ownership, whether one or both parties were represented by third parties, 
whether one or both parties were repeat players, which party drafted the 
contract, indications of financial stability or insecurity, technical or other 
expertise, and whether the parties were individuals or institutions (i.e., 
associations, unions, business entities, government entities, etc.).52 If it 
was not clear from the facts of the case which party had more bargaining 
power compared to the other, I did not assign a designation to the parties 
at all. The mined data will be referenced as needed in the discussion that 
follows. 
B. PACTA SUNT SERVANDA53 
The data collected for this Article are summarized in the following 
series of tables. The first two tables focus explicitly on the data 
addressing the easy in/difficult out theory. 
Table 2 aggregates the data for all of the contract formation cases, 
which includes offer, acceptance and modification, by circuit.54 Table 2 
reveals that the courts in the two circuits are split. The easy in part of the 
theory seems to be an accurate representation of what happens in the 
Seventh Circuit but not in the Ninth Circuit. Specifically, courts in the 
Seventh Circuit ruled that a contract was formed in fifty-eight percent of 
the cases and not formed in the other forty-two percent, whereas courts 
in the Ninth Circuit ruled that a contract was formed in only twenty-
seven percent of the cases and not formed in the other seventy-three 
percent. When the data for both circuits are aggregated, however, the 
 
 51. See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 
75 Mo. L. Rev. 493, 522–24 (2010). 
 52. Id. 
 53. This Latin phrase means “all promises must be kept.” John Edward Murray, Jr., Murray on 
Contracts § 53[A], at 220 (5th ed. 2011). 
 54. See supra note 43. Because a modification is itself a new contract, meaning it generally has to 
satisfy the contract formation elements, this doctrine was “counted” in Table 2. 
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cases indicate that a contract was formed forty-three percent of the time 
but not formed fifty-six percent of the time.55 
The best that can be said about the easy in part of the theory, 
therefore, is that the data is inconclusive. The data do not clearly support 
a finding that it is particularly easy to get into a contract. 
 


























Offer 14 9 5 15 2 13 
Acceptance 29 16 13 24 11 13 
Modification 22 13 9 23 4 19 









That said, the opposite appears to be true for the difficult out part of 
the easy in/difficult out theory. Table 3 aggregates the data for all of the 
contract defenses that enable a party to get out of a contract57 by circuit. 
The data indicate that courts in both circuits do not let parties out of 
their contracts very often. 
More specifically, duress and impracticability were not successful in 
getting the contracting party that raised the claim out of its contract duty 
in a single one of the captured cases in the Seventh Circuit. Parties fared 
much better in the modification context, with the courts finding that a 
modification was valid in fifty-nine percent of the cases (that is, the 
original contract duty was replaced by a modified duty).58 All told, 
however, the courts in the Seventh Circuit did not let parties out of their 
contracts in seventy percent of the cases.59 
 
 55. The percentage totals in the text were calculated by adding the cases in each circuit that 
resulted in contract formation, for example, and then dividing those totals by the total number of 
formation cases. The equation would thus look like this: (38 cases (7th Circuit) + 17 cases (9th 
Circuit)) ÷ 127 (the total number of formation cases in each circuit) = 43%. A similar equation was 
used to determine the percentage total for cases that resulted in no contract being formed. 
 56. See Appendix 3 for a list of all the cases in Table 2. 
 57. Those defenses are duress, impracticability, and modification. See supra note 43. Table 3 also 
includes modifications because, if a contract is modified, then the original contract duty is essentially 
discharged. 
 58. To calculate the percentage in the text, the number of cases in which a modification was 
found to exist (thereby discharging the original performance) was divided by the total number of 
modification cases in the Seventh Circuit. Thus the equation would be: 13 (cases where modification 
was found to exist) ÷ 22 (total modification cases) = 59%. 
 59. See infra Table 3. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, given its activist image,60 the Ninth Circuit 
numbers paint a very similar picture. Duress and impracticability failed 
to get parties out of their contracts in ninety-four percent and seventy-
five percent of the cases, respectively. And unlike the Seventh Circuit, 
parties in the Ninth Circuit were unsuccessful in modifying their contracts 
in eighty-three percent of the cases.61 Taken together, therefore, courts in 
the Ninth Circuit did not let parties out of their contracts in eighty-one 
percent of the cases.62 
When the data from both circuits are aggregated, the cases indicate 
that a party got out of its contract twenty-two percent of the time but was 
locked into its contract seventy-eight percent of the time.63 It seems safe 
to say, therefore, that the data support the theory that it is very difficult 
to get out of a contract. 






















Duress 10 0 10 16 1 15 
Impracticability 12 0 12 24 6 18 









In sum, the cases captured for this Article do not completely 
validate the easy in/difficult out theory. Easy in appears debatable; 
difficult out seems to be established. The equivocal nature of this finding 
could be a function of the sample size—a total of 189 cases were collected, 
but only from the federal and state courts within the jurisdiction of two of 
the thirteen federal circuit courts of appeals. 
The finding could also be a function of the “type of case” captured 
for this Article, in the sense that the cases collected here were ones that 
were litigated in court (as opposed to being removed via an arbitration 
clause) with the opinions made available on Lexis. It seems clear that 
arbitration clauses pull a lot of cases out of court. More specifically, 
 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
 61. To calculate the percentage in the text, the number of cases in which a modification was not 
found to exist and the original performance thereby not discharged by the total number of modification 
cases in the Ninth Circuit. Thus the equation would be: 19 (cases where modification was found not to 
exist) ÷ 23 (total modification cases) = 83%. 
 62. See infra Table 3. 
 63. The percentage totals representing the averages in the text were calculated by adding the 
cases in each circuit that resulted in the contract not being discharged, for example, and then dividing 
those totals by the total number of contract defense cases. The equation would thus look like this: 31 
cases (7th Cir.) + 52 cases (9th Cir.) ÷ 107 (the total number of contract defense cases in each Circuit) = 78%. 
 64. See Appendix 4 for a list of all the cases in Table 3. 
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unconscionability cases were collected for a different project. Those 
cases indicate all of the following: (1) between 2011 and 2014 (after 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion65 was decided), there were forty-one 
unconscionability cases litigated in the Ninth Circuit; (2) all but two of 
those cases involved the enforceability of arbitration clauses; and (3) of 
the thirty-nine arbitration clause cases, the courts in the Ninth Circuit 
enforced the arbitration clauses against an unconscionability challenge in 
twenty-eight (seventy-two percent) of those cases.66 In addition, under 
arbitration’s separability doctrine, challenges to the validity of the 
contract itself are also determined by the arbitrator.67 This means that 
arbitration would keep many duress and impracticability cases, for 
example, from being litigated in court. There is simply no way of 
knowing what impact this siphoning off of contract law cases has on 
either the development of the common law of contract in general or the 
easy in/difficult out theory in particular. 
The data could also reflect a contract theory different from the easy 
in/difficult out model suggested in Part I—one that posits instead that 
contracts should not be entered into lightly, but, once entered into, 
should be binding on the parties. This alternative theory is premised on 
the idea that the elements of contract formation in general, such as offer 
and acceptance, should serve cautionary and channeling functions that 
encourage contracting parties to deliberate before entering into a contract 
and signify in a legally recognizable way their intent to enter a contract 
that is legally binding.68 
Finally, the inconclusive nature of the data with respect to the easy 
in part of the easy in/difficult out theory may very well signal that how a 
contract is, or should be, formed in the twenty-first century is in flux.69 
But even with the inconclusive data and assuming that this last 
proposition is true, there is no denying that contracts are still being 
formed and that, once formed, parties are generally going to be held to 
their contracts. Thus, the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda 
seems to be alive and well. 
 
 65. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 66. See Appendix 5. 
 67. See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (articulating the 
separability doctrine for the first time). 
 68. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 800–01 (1941); see also 
Curtis Bridgeman, Default Rules in Private and Public Law: Default Rules in Economic Relationships: 
Contract Law: Default Rules, Penalty Default Rules, and New Formalism, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 683, 
687 (2006); Kim, supra note 31. 
 69. See generally Bayern, supra note 40 (arguing that the antiquated concepts of offer and 
acceptance are just ill-suited to how contracts are or should be formed in the twenty-first century); see 
also Kim, supra note 31. 
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C. Stronger Versus Weaker Parties 
The finding that parties will be bound to their contracts is consistent 
with other contract law studies.70 But additional data from the captured 
cases add a potential twist to this story. Recall that all of the captured 
cases were mined for certain pieces of data including which party prevailed 
with respect to the doctrine (i.e., which party got the outcome it wanted in 
the case),71 and, where possible, which party was stronger than the other 
in terms of relative bargaining power.72 These additional data points are 
summarized for each circuit in Tables 4 and 5. 
For example, the first line in Table 4 indicates that with respect to 
offers in the Seventh Circuit, the stronger party got the outcome that it 
wanted in seven of the fourteen offer cases, regardless of whether that 
outcome was for the court to find that an offer was made or not. In 
contrast, the weaker party only prevailed in three of the fourteen cases. 
No designation was made regarding the parties’ relative bargaining 
power in the four remaining cases. Table 4 lays out the data in this 
pattern for each of the other four doctrines surveyed for this Article. The 
Table then aggregates the data by providing both the raw number totals 
for each party and the average number of times (represented by a 
percentage) each party got the outcome it wanted overall. Based on the 
data, the stronger party in the Seventh Circuit cases prevailed fifty percent 
of the time, whereas the weaker party only prevailed twenty-eight percent 
of the time.73 
Table 5 aggregates and lays out the data in identical fashion for the 
Ninth Circuit. The stronger party fared better in the Ninth Circuit than in 
the Seventh Circuit, prevailing fifty-nine percent of the time compared to 
the weaker party, which prevailed only twenty percent of the time. 
 
 70. See DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 39; Giesel, supra note 39. 
 71. Recall also that the cases selected for this article only include cases that “decided” the 
contract law doctrine at issue. “Deciding” the contract law doctrine thus includes motions to dismiss 
and motions for summary judgment that were granted with no subsequent negative appellate history 
and/or affirmed on appeal. Though rare, cases that decided the contract law issue as a matter of law on 
a motion to dismiss or on summary judgment that was ultimately reversed were also included as were 
cases that went to final judgment. The prevailing party, therefore, is literally the party who prevailed 
in court under the circumstances just described. 
 72. See supra Part II.A. 
 73. This value was calculated by: 7 offer cases + 13 acceptance cases + 11 modification cases + 8 duress 
cases + 5 impracticability cases = 44 ÷ 87 (total number of captured cases for the 7th Circuit) = 50%. 
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Table 4: Prevailing Parties by Doctrine—Seventh Circuit74 
 Number of 
Cases Stronger Party Weaker Party Undesignated 
Offer 14 7 3 4 
Acceptance 29 13 10 6 
Modification 22 11 7 4 
Duress 10 8 1 1 
Impracticability 12 5 3 4 






Table 5: Prevailing Parties by Doctrine—Ninth Circuit75 
 Number of 
Cases Stronger Party Weaker Party Undesignated 
Offer 15 9 3 3 
Acceptance 24 10 6 8 
Modification 23 16 4 3 
Duress 16 12 1 3 
Impracticability 24 13 6 5 







When all of the cases are combined (see Table 6 below), the 
stronger party prevailed fifty-five percent of the time, and the weaker 
party prevailed twenty-three percent of the time.76 It was not possible to 
determine which party was stronger or weaker in terms of relative 
bargaining power in the remaining twenty-two percent of the cases. The 
data therefore suggest that the stronger contracting party tends to get the 
outcome that it wants most of the time, regardless of the doctrine at 
issue, and generally, the position it takes with respect to the doctrine.77 In 
other words, the stronger party prevailed regardless if it wanted a 
contract to be formed or not, or whether it wanted a contract duty 
discharged or not. Home loan modifications are a particularly problematic 
example of this phenomenon and are analyzed in the next part. 
 
 74. See Appendix 6 for a list of all the cases in Table 4. 
 75. See Appendix 7 for a list of all the cases in Table 5. 
 76. See Appendices 6 & 7. 
 77. The exceptions would be duress and home loan modifications. The stronger party rarely, if 
ever, raised duress in the cases captured for this article. In fact, this only occurred once in a Seventh 
Circuit duress case. See Putz v. Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577, 579 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (plaintiff was 
designated the stronger contracting party in a family cohabitation dissolution case because he was the 
jewelry store owner and the defendant worked in the plaintiff’s store for no pay during their eleven-
year relationship). In the home loan modification context, the stronger party, the bank or lender, 
always opposed the modification. 
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Table 6: Prevailing Parties Aggregated78 
 Total Number 









 1. Home Loan Modifications—A Case Study 
Modifications were included in this case study because they are 
implicated in both parts of the easy in/difficult out theory analyzed in 
Part II.B. This is because a modification is both an out and an in. A 
contract modification is therefore an interesting doctrine because it 
overlaps with both formation and performance. More specifically, a 
modification permits a party to get out of performing a contract duty by 
substituting a modified obligation for the original contract duty.79 But a 
modification is itself a contract that generally must satisfy the contract 
formation requirements80 and, therefore, presents a separate opportunity 
to form a contract. Thus, to get out of a contract duty one must first get 
into a new contract. 
Needless to say, to get into a new contract, the other party to the 
original contract has to consent, because the parties in a modification 
context are already bound by an existing contract. In all likelihood, only 
one of the parties wants or needs to modify a contract’s duty or duties.81 
But whether the party that wants or needs to modify its duty will be let 
out of the original contract is entirely dependent on whether the other 
contracting party will agree to a modification. Consequently, this space 
between the existing contract and the possibility of a new one is fraught 
with the potential for abuse of power.82 
 
 78. See Appendices 6 & 7. 
 79. See, e.g., Leavitt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04-C-7451, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13004, 
at *24 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007). 
 80. Id. 
 81. If both parties wanted or needed to modify their original duties at the same time or risk 
breaching the original contract, it seems reasonable to think that the parties would simply agree to 
either modify their contract or walk away from the original one.  
 82. The potential for abuse of power in a modification context is mutual. It could come from the 
party requesting the modification in the form of the classic “hold-up game,” which is the situation 
where one party to a contract refuses to perform under circumstances that make it difficult, or even 
impossible, for the other party to arrange a substitute performance, unless the other party agrees to 
provide additional consideration. See Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 635 (R.I. 1974) (discussing hold 
up game). Or it could come from the non-requesting party who wants to insist on the original contract 
duty, regardless of the circumstances prompting the request for a modification. See Deborah L. Threedy, A 
Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 185, 187–88 (discussing alternative 
interpretation of the Alaska Packers’ Association v. Dominico modification case); Meredith Miller, 
Revisiting Austin v. Loral: A Study in Economic Duress, Contract Modification and Framing, 2 Hastings 
Bus. L.J. 357, 359 (2006) (discussing alternative interpretation of the Austin v. Loral modification case). It 
should go without saying, however, that just because the potential to abuse one’s bargaining power 
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Consent is one of the conventional hallmarks of the contract law 
system, because parties are not bound by a contract unless they consent 
to it in the first place.83 Contractual liability in other words has to be 
voluntarily assumed.84 It is by insisting on voluntary agreement (i.e., 
consent by the parties), therefore, that contract law gives effect to the 
parties’ individual liberty and freedom, that is, to their ostensibly private 
decision to assume liability via a contract (or not) without interference 
from the State.85 And, as we have seen, a contract voluntarily entered into 
will be binding on the parties according to its terms.86 One proposition 
follows from the other—contract law makes contracts binding because 
they are premised on the belief that contracts are voluntarily entered 
into.87 This then is freedom of contract.88 Under this theory, one could 
therefore argue that courts police modifications using various contract 
doctrines to make sure that the decision to enter into the modification 
was freely made. 
Cases in the Ninth Circuit seem to support the foregoing proposition. 
Courts have held, for example, that an enforceable home loan 
modification did not exist because the lender did not make a promise to 
modify the loan,89 there was no meeting of the minds with respect to 
essential terms of the modification,90 or the purported modification 
lacked consideration91 or was barred by the Statute of Frauds.92 Courts 
reached these holdings even where homeowners alleged that their lenders 
acted egregiously. 
In 2006, Duane and Beverly Mulville obtained two loans from Wells 
Fargo totaling $1.5 million, both of which were secured by a mortgage on 
 
exists, it does not mean that such power is or will be abused by one of the contracting parties. But to 
not acknowledge the potential for abuse denies its existence. 
 83. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 479 (1988). 
 84. See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a 
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 Pa. L. Rev. 1235, 1247 (1998); Jay M. 
Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1283, 1286 (1990). 
 85. See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 408 (1979), Feinman, 
supra note 84, at 1286; Jay M. Feinman, Contract After the Fall, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 1537, 1543 (1987). 
 86. See supra Part II.B.; see also Singer, supra note 83, at 479. 
 87. For a more complete discussion and critique of all of the assumptions contract law makes to 
justify making contracts binding, see generally Hart, Reality, supra note 1. 
 88. See Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 Cornell L. Rev. 365, 373 (1921); see also Singer, 
supra note 69, at 479. 
 89. Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34322, at *39–40 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013).  
 90. Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (D. Or. 2010). 
 91. Id. at 1174; Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34322, 
at *41 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013). 
 92. See Womack v. Bank of Am., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 909, at *4 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2007); Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B227388, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8055, at *7–13 (Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2011); Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B237831, 2012 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 8285, at *13–18 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012); Toneman v. U.S. Bank, No. CV 12-09369-
MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84240, at *18–21 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013). 
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their home.93 Shortly thereafter, the Mulvilles experienced financial 
difficulties and defaulted on both loans.94 As a result, they sought a 
modification from the bank to avoid foreclosure.95 The homeowners 
alleged that Wells Fargo demanded an initial $5000 payment to begin the 
modification process.96 Over the course of a year they were asked to 
submit and resubmit documents that had already been submitted to the 
bank.97 After about a year in, they were told that Wells Fargo could begin 
to modify their loan if they paid an additional $30,000.98 They were then 
allegedly told that if they settled the second of the two loans that “Wells 
Fargo would permanently modify the first loan so that [the borrowers] 
could meet their monthly payments.”99 Wells Fargo did not put this 
promise in writing.100 The homeowners settled the second loan but were 
then informed by Wells Fargo that their payment to settle the second 
loan indicated that they had too much cash and were therefore not 
candidates for a permanent modification of the first loan.101 The 
homeowners alleged that they would never have settled the second loan 
if they were not promised a modification of the first, because they 
struggled to come up with the cash to do so and were facing severe tax 
consequences as a result.102 Wells Fargo denied promising a permanent 
modification.103 
The Mulvilles sued Wells Fargo for, among other things, breach of 
contract, based on their claim that the bank orally agreed to modify their 
first loan, that is, to let them out of their original contract.104 The court 
held that even assuming that the bank agreed to modify their loan, the 
bank’s oral promise to modify the Mulvilles’ home loan was barred by 
the Statute of Frauds.105 
The Mulvilles’ tale of financial distress and their subsequent default 
on their mortgage were not unique. It played itself out all across the 
country.106 In a story well known by now, the housing market in the 
 
 93. Mulville, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8285, at *3. 
 94. Id. at *2. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at *3. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at *4. 
 99. Id. at *4 . 
 100. Id. at *5. 
 101. Id. at *4. 
 102. Id. at *5–6. 
 103. Id. at *4–5. 
 104. Id. at *13. 
 105. Id. at *13–16. 
 106. See, e.g., Capital Area Asset Builders et al., Subprime Mortgage Lending in the District 
of Columbia: A Study for the Department of Insurance, Securities and Banking 1, 7, 10, 14–15 (2008), 
http://www.trfund.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Subprime_Lending_Study_6_20_08_DC.pdf (discussing 
the foreclosure crisis in the District of Columbia); The Reinvestment Fund for the Balt. 
Homeownership Pres. Coal., Mortgage Foreclosure Filings in Maryland 6, 26, 34 (2008), 
Hart_23 (Dukanovic) 8/27/2015 9:31 PM 
1680 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1661 
United States started to implode in 2007.107 In 2008, Congress passed the 
Emergency Stabilization Act,108 which included the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (“TARP”).109 TARP required the Secretary of the 
Treasury to implement a plan designed to minimize home foreclosures.110 
Pursuant to this authority, the U.S. Treasury Department created the 
Making Home Affordable Program (“MHAP”), part of which included 
the creation and implementation of HAMP.111 HAMP, which was 
introduced on February 19, 2009,112 is a program designed to implement a 
residential loan modification process113 pursuant to directives issued by 
the Treasury Department.114  
The Secretary of the Treasury set aside $50 billion of TARP funds 
to incentivize lenders to refinance mortgages with more favorable 
interest rates, term of payment extensions, and principal reductions, 
thereby allowing homeowners to avoid foreclosure.115 While participation 
in HAMP was voluntary,116 the Secretary of Treasury was nevertheless 
able to negotiate Service Participation Agreements (“SPAs”) with many 
of the major bank servicers in the United States.117 Pursuant to the SPAs, 
the “servicers agreed to identify homeowners who were in default or 
would likely soon be in default on their mortgage payments, and to 
modify the loans of those eligible under the program.”118 But more than 
that, the SPAs explicitly stated that loan servicers “‘shall perform the 
loan modification . . . described in . . . the Program guidelines and 
procedures issued by the Treasury . . . and . . . any supplemental 
documentation, instructions, bulletins, letters, directives, or other 
 
http://www.trfund.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MarylandForeclosure.pdf (discussing the foreclosure 
crisis in Maryland). 
 107. Sumit Agarwal, et al., Policy Intervention in Debt Renegotiation: Evidence from the Home 
Affordable Modification Program 6–7 (FRB of Chi., Working Paper No. 2013-27, Kreisman Working 
Paper Series in Hous. Law and Policy No. 7, Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2369419. 
 108. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
 109. Id. tit. I, §§ 101–136, 122 Stat. at 3767–3800.  
 110. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 111. McGann v. PNC Bank, No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46484, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 29, 2013). 
 112. Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 7. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Wigod, 673 F.3d. at 556; see U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury Supplemental Directive No. 09-01: 
Introduction of the Home Affordable Modification Program (2009), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/ 
programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd0901.pdf [hereinafter Supplemental Directive No. 09-01]; see also U.S. 
Dep’t. of the Treasury, Supplemental Directive No. 10-01: Home Affordable Modification Program–
Program Update and Resolution of Active Trial Modifications (2010), https://www.hmpadmin.com/ 
portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd1001.pdf [hereinafter Supplemental Directive No. 10-01]. 
 115. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 556; Morales v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49698, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 18. 
 116. Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 9. 
 117. Id. One case puts the number of SPAs negotiated by the Secretary of the Treasury in the 
dozens. See Wigod, 673 F.3d. at 556. 
 118. Wigod, 673 F.3d. at 556. 
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communications . . . issued by the Treasury.’”119 In exchange, loan servicers 
would receive monetary incentives in excess of their normal compensation 
for servicing a loan.120 According to one court, Wells Fargo, which signed 
an SPA, was eligible to receive over $2.75 billion in taxpayer funds for 
participating in HAMP.121 
Very briefly, the HAMP loan modification process takes place in 
two broad stages. In the first stage, the servicer determines whether the 
homeowner is eligible for a HAMP modification. The servicer gathers 
information from the homeowner to make sure that the homeowner 
satisfies certain threshold requirements122 and financial eligibility 
requirements.123 The servicer then applies a Net Present Value (“NPV”) 
test to determine  
whether the modified mortgage’s value to the servicer would be 
greater than the return on the mortgage if unmodified. . . . If the 
NPV result was negative—that is, the value of the modified 
mortgage would be lower than the servicer’s expected return 
after foreclosure—the servicer was not obliged to offer a 
modification. If the NPV was positive, however, the Treasury 
directives said that “the servicer MUST offer the 
modification.”124 
If the homeowner qualifies for a HAMP modification in stage one, 
the second stage involves the actual loan modification process starting 
with the servicer implementing a Trial Period Plan (“TPP”) using new 
loan repayment terms.125 The TPP generally lasts six months or so.126 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 8. 
 121. Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34322, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (“Under the terms of the SPA, Wells Fargo was eligible to receive 
$2,873,000,000 in taxpayer funds.”); see McGann v. PNC Bank, No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46484, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013) (“In connection with the SPA, PNC received 
$58,300,000 in incentive payments in exchange for modifying mortgage obligations of eligible 
homeowners to prevent and reduce foreclosures.”). 
 122. The threshold requirements include: a loan secured by the borrower’s primary residence with 
an origination date of on or before January 1, 2009; mortgage payments of more than thirty-one 
percent of the borrower’s monthly income; and a current unpaid principal balance of no more than 
$729,750 for a one-unit home. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012); 
Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 7. 
 123. Wigod, 673 F.3d. at 556; Morales v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49698, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); see Supplemental Directive 09-01, supra note 
114, at 2–4. 
 124. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 557 (emphasis added)(internal citations omitted); Morales, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49698, at *4; see also Supplemental Directive No. 09-01, supra note 114, at 4 (“If the NPV 
result for the modification scenario is greater than the NPV result for no modification, the result is 
deemed “positive” and the servicer MUST offer the modification.”). 
 125. Prior to Supplemental Directive No. 09-01, a loan servicer could initiate a Trial Payment Plan 
based on a homeowner’s undocumented representations about her finances. After Supplemental 
Directive No. 10-01, which was issued on January 28, 2010, a homeowner is required to provide 
documentation before a servicer can implement a TPP. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 557; Supplemental 
Directive No. 09-01, supra note 114, at 5; Supplemental Directive No. 10-01, supra note 114, at 1–2. 
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After the trial period, if the homeowner complies with all of the terms of 
the TPP agreement, including making all payments and providing all 
required documentation, and if all of the homeowner’s representations 
remain true and correct, then the servicer is required under the HAMP 
guidelines to offer the homeowner a permanent modification.127 
Significantly, because of the financial incentives loan servicers were 
to receive, loan servicers were required via HAMP’s “must offer” 
language to offer homeowners a modification if the homeowners 
satisfied the HAMP prerequisites. More specifically, “‘[w]hen [a lender] 
received public tax dollars under [TARP], it agreed to offer TPP’s and 
loan modifications under HAMP according to [regulations] . . . issued by 
the Department of the Treasury.’”128 Thus, “‘if the lender fails to do so 
[i.e., offer the permanent modification], the borrower may sue the 
lender, under state law, for breach of contract of the trial modification 
plan, among other causes of action.’”129 
In short, Congress via HAMP changed the traditional common law 
rules for a valid modification. In the specific context of residential home 
loan modifications, Congress created a new two-stage process that, if 
satisfied, replaced the requirement of actual consent with constructive 
consent to the modification on the part of loan servicers. The foregoing 
interpretation is consistent with HAMP guidelines and directives and 
with a reading of TPPs that gives effect to all of the language contained 
in them.130 
That said, many courts in both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have 
refused to acknowledge loan modifications based on the idea of 
constructive consent. They have held instead that homeowners failed to 
establish that they were entitled to a HAMP modification. More 
specifically, there were a total of four HAMP modification cases in the 
Seventh Circuit. The loan servicers prevailed in three of the cases 
(seventy-five percent), with the court ruling that there was no modification 
or agreement to modify the homeowner’s mortgages.131 The homeowner 
prevailed in one case (twenty-five percent), with the Seventh Circuit 
holding that the homeowner sufficiently alleged that the loan servicer 
 
 126. See Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 8; see also Wigod, 673 F.3d at 557 (noting TPPs last three 
or more months). 
 127. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 558; Supplemental Directive No. 09-01, supra note 114, at 4 (“If the NPV 
result for the modification scenario is greater than the NPV result for no modification, the result is 
deemed ‘positive’ and the servicer MUST offer the modification.”); cf. McGann v. PNC Bank, No. 11-
CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46484, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013).  
 128. Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B243614, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 789, at *23 (Ct. 
App. Jan. 30, 2014) (citation omitted). 
 129. Id. (citation omitted). 
 130. See Wigod, 673 F.3d 547; Goodman, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 789. 
 131. Avevedo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11-C4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461 (N.D. Ill. July 
25, 2012); McGann, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46484; Baehl v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-
RLY-WGH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2013). 
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breached a contract to offer her a permanent modification to survive a 
motion to dismiss.132  
There were a total of eight HAMP modification cases in the Ninth 
Circuit. The loan servicers prevailed in six of the cases (meaning, in 
seventy-five percent, there was no modification or agreement to 
modify),133 and the homeowners prevailed in the other two (that is, twenty-
five percent of claims of breach of contract to modify loans survived 
dismissal and demurrer).134 
The courts used a variety of methods to reconcile HAMP’s “must 
offer” requirement with their reluctance to acknowledge a modification 
lacking the actual consent of the loan servicers, including interpreting 
HAMP and TPP language very restrictively. Thus, for example, courts 
interpreted HAMP as requiring only that participating loan servicers 
consider eligible home loans for modification but not obligating servicers 
to actually modify eligible loans.135 
Courts also agreed with loan servicers’ determinations that all of the 
conditions required for a HAMP modification were not satisfied, and, 
therefore, a modification was properly denied. The loan servicers often 
took the position that the homeowners were not eligible for and/or did 
not qualify for a HAMP modification.136 Granted, if all of the conditions 
were not satisfied, the homeowners were not entitled to a HAMP 
modification. This determination of non-eligibility, however, was usually 
hotly contested by the homeowners137 and often in the context of defending 
 
 132. Wigod, 673 F.3d 547. 
 133. Juarez v. Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67850 
(E.D. Cal. May 13, 2013); Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34322 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013); Soin v. Fannie Mae, No. Civ. 2:12-634, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
51824 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012); Morales v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 49698 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 135 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 442 (Ct. App. 2011); Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B237831, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8285 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012). 
 134. Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Ct. App. 2012); Goodman, 2014 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 789. 
 135. See, e.g., Morales, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49698, at *17–18, *22 (citing cases); Mulville, 2012 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8285, at *9. 
 136. See infra text accompanying notes 142–49. 
 137. See Soin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51824, at *4–6 (denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary 
injunction where defendant did not execute TTP associated with plaintiffs’ loan and return it to them); 
Avevedo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11-C-4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. July 
25, 2012) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss breach of contract claim where defendant did not 
execute TTP associated with plaintiffs’ loan and return it to them); Graybill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34322, at *14–18 (dismissing homeowners’ breach of contract claim without prejudice despite expert’s 
determination that there were significant errors in the loan servicer’s NPV calculations disqualifying 
them from HAMP eligibility); Baehl v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-RLY-WGH, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 46445, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013) (seeking motion to dismiss homeowner’s claim 
where loan servicer asserted that homeowners failed to provide all documents requested); Goodman, 
2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 789, at *2–8 (appealing demurrer in favor of defendant where loan 
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against a motion to dismiss brought by the loan servicers138 where all facts 
are supposed to be construed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.139 
In particularly troubling examples, loan servicers also claimed that 
the homeowner was not entitled to a HAMP modification because the 
homeowner never received either an executed copy of the TPP140 or the 
permanent modification agreement141 from the loan servicer. Of course 
the reason the homeowner never received an executed copy of either of 
these documents was because the loan servicer never executed and sent 
them. But here again, courts have been willing to accept this argument as 
an independent basis upon which to uphold the loan servicers’ decisions 
to deny the HAMP modification. One court held, for example, that even 
if the homeowner was eligible for a HAMP modification, the fact that the 
homeowner did not get an executed copy of the permanent modification 
from the loan servicer meant that the homeowner was not entitled to the 
modification.142 
Loan servicers appear to rely on specific language in the TPP to 
make the above argument. The language in the TPP basically says that 
the TPP does not modify the homeowner’s loan documents unless and 
until the homeowner receives a fully executed copy of the modification 
agreement.143 Based on this language in the TPP, loan servicers essentially 
escape their “must offer” requirement by arguing that it is within their sole 
discretion to decide whether to send homeowners an executed copy of the 
TPP and/or permanent modification agreement.144 Interpreting the TPP 
in this fashion does several things: it nullifies other express provisions of 
the TPP;145 it gives the loan servicers unbridled discretion to decide if and 
when its obligations will arise; and it makes the offer contained in the 
TPP via the “must offer” requirement146 illusory.147 Unfortunately, none 
 
servicer claimed that homeowners failed to provide all documents requested, a claim the homeowners 
denied). 
 138. See Avevedo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461, at *5–6; Graybill, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34322, 
at *27; Baehl, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445, at *6. 
 139. See, e.g., Baehl, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445, at *6.  
 140. Soin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51824, at *14–15; Avevedo, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106461, at *7–
9; McGann v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46484, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 
29, 2013). 
 141. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49698, at *18 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 11, 2011); Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 447 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 142. See Morales, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49698, at *18. 
 143. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 562–63 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 144. Id. at 563. 
 145. Id. The bank’s interpretation of § 2 of the TPP would nullify the bank’s obligation under § 3 
of the TPP to send the homeowner a Modification Agreement if the homeowner complied with all of 
the requirements of the TPP and if her representations remained true and correct at the end of the 
TPP period. Id. 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27. 
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of these troubling consequences deter loan servicers from making these 
arguments or the courts from agreeing with them. 
Finally, loan servicers also use contract doctrines to justify denying 
homeowners HAMP modifications. They argued, for example, that the 
TPP is not an offer, that there is no consideration for a permanent 
modification, and that the terms of any purported permanent modification 
are not clear and definite enough to constitute an enforceable agreement.148 
Sometimes courts agree with them. One court held, for example, that 
while there was consideration for the TPP, there was none for a 
permanent modification.149 Another held that the TPP did not constitute 
an offer.150 And still another court, after concluding that no offer to modify 
the loan existed because the homeowner did not receive an executed copy 
of the TPP from the lender, held that sending the loan servicer the 
homeowner’s executed copy of the TPP did not amount to a counteroffer 
that was accepted by the servicer when it accepted all eight payments 
made by the homeowner.151 The result in these cases, of course, is that no 
modification exists despite the sometimes herculean efforts of homeowners 
to comply with the demands made by their loan servicers.152 
D. The Myth of Freedom of Contract 
At the end of the day, the stronger party (the banks) got the 
outcomes that they wanted more often than not (i.e., no home loan 
modifications) both before and after HAMP.153 That is, the stronger 
contracting party tended to prevail despite the fact that Congress created 
 
 147. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 563; accord Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B243614, 2014 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 789, at *27–29 (Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2014) (citing Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 146 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 90, 99 (Ct. App. 2012). 
 148. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 561–66 (rejecting all of the loan servicer’s contract doctrine 
arguments); accord Goodman, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 789, at *35–42. 
 149. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49698, at *12 
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011). 
 150. Baehl v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-RLY-WGH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445, 
at *31 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013). 
 151. McGann v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46484, at *19–20 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013).  
 152. See, e.g., Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B237831, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
8285 (Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012); Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34322 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013). 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36 (discussing the number of HAMP modification 
cases). There were a total of thirteen home loan modification cases in the Ninth Circuit five of which 
were non-HAMP cases. The banks prevailed in all five of these cases. See Toneman v. U.S. Bank, No. 
CV 12-09369-MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84240 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013); Evans v. 
Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 2:09-cv-02401-RLH-LRL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63410 (D. Nev. June 
18, 2010); Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Or. 2010); Womack v. Bank 
of Am., N.A., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 909 (Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2007); 
Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. B227388, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8055 (Ct. App. Oct. 
24, 2011). 
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“constructive consent” via HAMP in a specific effort to make home loan 
modifications easier for homeowners to obtain. The question is, why? 
A short answer to the question could be that courts simply adhere to 
an idealized notion of freedom of contract.154 HAMP, because it 
legislatively mandates “constructive consent,” is state-sponsored 
interference in transactions that are supposed to be voluntarily entered 
into by private parties without any state intrusion. Courts thus resort to 
contract law doctrines, even in the HAMP context, because they seem to 
be convinced that real consent needs to exist between the parties; and the 
only way to be sure that real consent exists is to make sure that tried and 
tested contract law doctrines, like offer, acceptance, and consideration, are 
satisfied. HAMP, therefore, disrupts freedom of contract. 
The problem is that freedom of contract does not really exist. I have 
made this argument at length elsewhere, but will briefly touch on it 
here.155 First, freedom of contract is premised on the idea that contracts 
are consensual agreements between private parties when in reality all 
contracts are inherently coercive.156 If coercion at its most basic means 
that a threat induces parties to enter into a contract,157 then all contracts 
are coerced, because the law entitles each party to withhold from the 
other everything that she owns. Coercion thus exists every time a party 
agrees to enter into a contract to avoid the consequences of the other 
party’s threat. Consider the following illustration of the mutual coercion 
present in every contract. If an employer agrees to pay an employee to 
avoid the threat that the employee will withhold his labor, the employer’s 
decision to enter into the contract is coerced. Similarly, if the employee 
agrees to work for the employer to avoid the threat that the employer 
will withhold his money, the employee’s decision to enter into the 
contract is coerced. Every contract is thus the product of mutual 
coercion, and not voluntary agreement.158 
Second, freedom of contract does not actually exist because it 
presumes that contractual obligations are and can only be voluntarily 
assumed, that is, without any interference from the State.159 This 
presumption is also incorrect. A contract is a contract if the law provides a 
remedy for its breach.160 In other words, a contract is a contract if the law 
(i.e., the State) says it is, meaning that the State through its courts 
 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90. 
 155. See, e.g., Hart, Reality, supra note 1. 
 156. Id. at 39–45. 
 157. Id. at 41 (citation omitted). 
 158. Id. at 39–41. 
 159. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90; see also Hila Keren, The Libertarian/Neoliberal 
Catch-22: Between a Market Society and a Vulnerable State 2 (Nov. 17, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 160. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §1 (1981). 
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determines that the formation elements are satisfied and there are no 
defenses to its enforcement.161 
Finally, freedom of contract does not really exist if we mean that it 
applies to everyone equally. Professor Hila Keren argues that freedom of 
contract includes at least three different aspects of freedom—the 
freedom to have a contract, the freedom to negotiate the terms of a 
contract, and the freedom from contracts and contract law—all of which 
reflect the perspective of the stronger contracting party.162 
Stronger contracting parties, Keren argues, enjoy the freedom to 
choose whether to contract and with whom (the freedom to have a 
contract), and to choose the terms of the contract (the freedom to negotiate 
terms).163 For example, if a bank decides to modify one homeowner’s loan 
but not another’s, the bank is simply exercising its autonomy and using its 
protected liberties, neither of which should be interfered with, especially 
not by the State.164 Stronger contracting parties can also stipulate that 
contract law will not govern their contracts as they sometimes do when 
dealing with another strong contracting party (the freedom from 
contract).165 
Weaker contracting parties do not have similar freedoms. If the loan 
servicer denies the homeowners a modification of their home loan, even 
if they are eligible for the modification, or the property owner refuses to 
lease her property to the single mother, the rejected applicant has no 
freedom of contract whatsoever. Indeed, they are precluded from 
entering the contractual arena entirely and there is nothing they can do 
about it.166 It also seems abundantly clear that weaker contracting parties 
cannot negotiate the terms of their contracts. Consumers, for example, 
routinely agree to long, complicated contracts that they cannot 
understand, negotiate, or change.167 And, in modern society, just about 
everything one needs or wants must be obtained via a contract.168 Weaker 
parties, therefore, have no freedom from contract; they cannot opt out. 
In reality, therefore, freedom of contract just does not exist. It is a 
myth, one that we cling to with potentially adverse, if not devastating, 
consequences for weaker contracting parties. What to make of and do 
with all of this is taken up in the next Part. 
 
 161. See supra Part III.B; see Hart, Reality, supra note 1, at 45–47. 
 162. Keren, supra note 159, at 3–7. 
 163. Id. at 3. 
 164. Id. at 3–4. 
 165. Id. at 4; see also Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 115 (1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 
99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724, 1724 (2001). 
 166. Keren, supra note 159, at 4. 
 167. Id. at 5; see also Kim, supra note 31, at 35–43, 62–69. 
 168. Keren, supra note 159, at 6; Kim, supra note 31, at 4. 
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III.  Whose Contract Law Is It Anyway? 
Part III of this Article can be summed up as follows: It is not clear 
from the captured cases how easy it is to get into a contract. The cases do 
point to the possibility, however, that the stronger contracting party 
tends to get the outcome that it wants in contract disputes. So, the 
stronger contracting party may well influence whether a contract is 
formed to begin with. But once formed, the cases suggest that it is very 
difficult to get out of a contract. 
Assuming all of the foregoing statements are true, do they signal a 
problem? Society obviously needs some kind of system to facilitate the 
transfer of resources from one party to another; contracts and contract 
law is that system. We can also probably assume that many, perhaps even 
most, contracts function in the sense that both contracting parties get 
something that they want from the contract and then walk away once 
that contract is performed. 
But consider a problematic contract. A problematic contract is 
defined here to mean a contract obtained through misuse of unequal 
bargaining power that results in a bad bargain for the weaker party.169 It 
is important to note that the problematic contract is not confined to 
consumers—it affects businesses as well170—or to standard forms.171 The 
reach of this type of contract is therefore much broader than is currently 
being conceptualized.172 
The question then becomes whether contract law addresses this kind 
of problematic contract effectively, which brings us full circle. Contract 
law is not set up in a way that effectively addresses these kinds of 
contracts because of the structural feature discussed above: once formed, 
it is very difficult to get out of the contract. The result is that the misuse 
of unequal bargaining power by the stronger party during the formation 
of the contract will likely go unchecked, and the weaker party will be 
locked into the bad bargain. The stronger party will get to keep its ill-
 
 169. Absent the misuse of bargaining power and a bad bargain, contract law does not recognize the 
contract as problematic. See Hart, Formation, supra note 1, at 178–82.  
 170. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013) (alleging that 
contracts signed by merchants with American Express violated antitrust laws). There, the Supreme 
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act did not permit courts to invalidate the class action waiver 
in the American Express contracts on the ground that the plaintiffs’ cost of individually arbitrating a 
federal statutory claim exceeded the potential recovery. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Krilich v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153, 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). In 
Krilich, a real estate developer raised economic duress to get out of a contract. The court held that 
duress could not be established because the developer was a sophisticated party who was represented 
by counsel throughout the contracting process. Id.  
 172. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 31 (focusing on consumers); Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate 
(2013) (focusing on consumers and boilerplate in standard forms). 
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gotten gains because the contract and all of its terms (both reasonable 
and unreasonable) will be binding.173 
So, is there really a problem here? The short answer is, yes. There is 
a problem when contract law enables people with more bargaining power 
to misuse their bargaining power with impunity.174 Indeed, the fact that 
contracts are generally going to be binding175 could conceivably give the 
stronger contracting party license (if not perverse incentive) to impose 
even more onerous, one-sided terms in the contract.176 Unfortunately, 
this is precisely what Kim argues that the drafters of online contracts 
already do.177 The frequency with which this misuse of bargaining power 
occurs will most likely be largely undetected because a significant number 
of these cases will be resolved in arbitration proceedings through 
mandatory arbitration clauses inserted into contracts by the stronger 
contracting party.178 
Any solution to the problems confronting contract law, therefore, 
will have to address bargaining power directly and effectively, which is 
no small task. Indeed, HAMP was a specific effort by Congress to temper 
the banks’ unequal bargaining power by mandating constructive consent 
on the part of the banks if the HAMP requirements were met.179 But 
HAMP was not very successful180 at least in part because courts are so 
wedded to a freedom of contract ideal that does not exist181 that they fail 
to abide by the HAMP regulations that depart from that ideal. 
Thus, the first step to effectively address the misuse of bargaining 
power imbalances in contract law is perhaps an unexpected one. More 
specifically, the frame from within which contract law is analyzed and 
understood can and must be shifted from individual autonomy and liberty, 
which are the underpinnings of freedom of contract, to equality.182 
Elsewhere I have written: 
 
 173. See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Cross Purposes & Unintended Consequences: Karl Llewellyn, 
Article 2, and the Limits of Social Transformation, 12 Nev. L.J. 54, 63–65 (2012); see also Knapp, supra 
note 5, at 115, 121. 
 174. Again, it should go without saying that just because the potential to abuse one’s bargaining 
power exists does not mean that such power is or will be abused by the stronger contracting party. But 
to not acknowledge the potential for abuse denies its existence. 
 175. See supra Part II; see also Hart, Formation, supra note 1, at Part III. 
 176. See Hart, Formation, supra note 1, at 217. 
 177. See Kim, supra note 31, at 51, 72–73, and see ch. 5 generally; see also Knapp, supra note 5, at 
110–13. 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 67–70. 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 108–32. 
 180. See Agarwal et al., supra note 107, at 3–6.  
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 85–90. 
 182. I plan to develop this argument in detail in my forthcoming book, Danielle Kie Hart, From 
Contract to Status, The Story of Contract Law & Inequality (forthcoming 2017); see also Keren, 
supra note 159, at 3 (arguing that the way to dismantle the dominant neoliberal model of freedom of 
contract is to “create a strong and compelling counter-narrative that both establishes a robust 
egalitarian freedom of contract and recognizes the State’s duty to secure all aspects of such freedom”). 
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At its most basic level, a “frame” is a tool that enables people to make 
sense of the world around them. But the process of framing is an active 
one because the purpose of framing is to fashion specific and ultimately 
shared understandings of the world that not only legitimate the 
meaning(s) proffered but also the response(s) to those meanings.183 
Shifting the frame of analysis is not an insignificant thing to do, 
because “by influencing what people think and how they think about it[,] 
the frames we choose to use can help shape reality.”184 More specifically, 
such a shift will enable if not require judges, advocates, and parties to 
examine the use or misuse of bargaining power in a given contracting 
situation. It will also allow what is possible within the institution of 
contract law to be re-imagined by judges (and legislatures), advocates, 
contract law scholars, and, hopefully, the public. Some of this re-
imagining would be internal to contract law and might include shifting 
the burden of proof with respect to doctrines like unconscionability185 and 
duress to the party accused of misusing its bargaining power. It might 
also include new, more robust interpretations of existing contract 
doctrines, like good faith and unconscionability,186 to name just two.187 
Within this new frame of understanding, individual parties 
(including businesses) will more readily be able to get out of unfair 
contracts. More systemically, and assuming collective action like class 
actions is possible, a business or perhaps even an entire industry might 
reform its practices; and legislatures may be more inclined to act to curb 
abuses of bargaining power. 
In short, the frame that governs the analysis dictates what 
constitutes a legitimate response to a problem and what can be imagined in 
terms of solutions to that problem. Consequently, shifting to an equality 
frame for contract law is the necessary first step to enable contract law to 
be reimagined in ways that not only reflect reality, but also help us to live 
up to our own aspirations individually and collectively. 
 
 183. Danielle Kie Hart, Revealing Privilege—Why Bother?, 42 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 131, 135–36 
(2013). 
 184. Id. at 136.  
 185. See, e.g., Knapp, supra note 5, at 128; Kim, supra note 31, at 203–10.  
 186. See, e.g., Hila Keren, Guilt-Free Markets? Unconscionability, Conscience, and Emotions, 
2015 BYU L. Rev. (forthcoming 2015) (advocating an interpretation and application of 
unconscionability that acknowledges its roots in conscience and the emotions generally as well as the 
expressive function of judicial decisions to shape behavior by market actors with the goal of fostering 
self-restraint in market transactions). 
 187. See generally Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality 
Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1025 (2003) (advocating 
judicial use of the doctrine of good faith as a device to eliminate racial subordination); Amy J. 
Schmitz, Confronting ADR Agreements’ Contract/No Contract Conundrum With Good Faith, 
56 DePaul L. Rev. 55 (2006) (advocating for the use of the doctrine of good faith to fill in gaps in 
ADR agreements). 
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Conclusion 
Unequal bargaining power exists. The vast majority of contracts, 
therefore, will have a stronger and a weaker party. Consequently, when 
and how bargaining power is deployed in contract settings is something 
that contract law needs to consider carefully, especially since pacta sunt 
servanda seems to be alive and well in the contract law system.188 That 
said, I do not think that “fixing” contract law by figuring out how to 
better address unequal bargaining power will cure any social problems. 
The task of re-imagining contract law, however, is still one well worth 
undertaking. This is because I agree with Knapp when he says that when 
we discuss contract law, what we are really talking about (at least in 
important part) is the place of contract law within the American legal 
system, and that system’s role in protecting the life, liberty, and pursuit of 
happiness of its people.189 
 
 188. See supra Part III.B. 
 189. Knapp, supra note 5, at 135. 
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LEXIS 1811 (July 29, 2002). 
2. Shea v. Household Bank (SB), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Ct. App. 2003).  
3. Gillani Consulting Inc. v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., No. C05-
0823-JCC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88704 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 2006), 
aff’d, 300 F. App’x 466 (9th. Cir. 2008). 
4. Wessa v. Watermark Paddlesports, Inc., No. C06-5156 FDB, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 51757 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2006). 
5. Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC, 161 P.3d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
6. Womack v. Bank of Am., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 909 (Nov. 20, 2007).  
7. Flores v. Jewels Mktg. & Agribusiness, No. CIV F 07-334 AWI WMW, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53127 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2007). 
8. Evans v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 2:09-cv-02401-RLH-LRL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63410 (D. Nev. June 18, 2010).  
9. Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Or. 
2010).  
10. Sociedad Aeronautica De, Santander S.A. v. Weber, No. CV 09-103-
M-DWM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71349 (D. Mont. July 14, 2010). 
11. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49698 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011). 
12. FDIC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. SACV 10-0713 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94842 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). 
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13. Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B227388, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8055 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
14. AAA Constr. of Missoula v. Choice Land Corp., 264 P.3d 709 (Mont. 
2011). 
15. Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442 (Ct. 
App. 2011), modified by No. B230580, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1504 
(Dec. 1, 2011). 
16. Soin v. Fannie Mae, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51824 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 
2012) 
17. Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Ct. 
App. 2012). 
18. Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B237831, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8285 (Nov. 14, 2012). 
19. Juarez v. Suntrust Mortg., No. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67850 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2013). 
20. Toneman v. U.S. Bank, No. CV 12-09369-MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 84240 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013). 
21. Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34322 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013). 
22. Dragicevich v. Chase Home Fin., No. CV 12-8192 ABC (MANx), 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112208 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013). 
23. Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B243614, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. 




1. Morrow v. Am. Int’l Grp., No. B144474, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 3120 (Mar. 13, 2002). 
2. Yemen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B144230, 2002 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2181 (Apr. 11, 2002).  
3. Dodi v. Am. Online, Inc., No. B158161, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
4085 (Apr. 24, 2003). 
4. Flower v. Pep Boys, No. D040667, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 8095 
(Aug. 26, 2003). 
5. Smith v. Rosenberg, No. E034199, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6189 
(June 29, 2004). 
6. Namdar v. Koop, No. G032726, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2087 
(Mar. 8, 2005). 
7. S & W Seed Co. v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. F043771, 2005 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 11723 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
8. Goodman v. Lothrop, 151 P.3d 818 (Idaho 2007).  
9. Perez v. Uline, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872 (Ct. App. 2007). 
HART_23 (DUKANOVIC) 8/27/2015 9:57 PM 
 
10. Murray v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. A117596, 2008 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 7864 (Sept. 15, 2008). 
11. Insitu, Inc. v. Kent, No. CV-08-3067-EFS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61190 (E.D. Wash. June 17, 2009), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 745 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
12. In re Moonlight Basin Ranch LP, No. 09-62327-11, 2010 Bankr. 
LEXIS 2198 (Bankr. Dist. Mont. June 25, 2010). 
13. Steinman v. Malamed, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 304 (Ct. App. 2010).  
14. Chan v. Lund, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App. 2010). 
15. Mortensen v. First Am. Title Co., No. 2:11-CV-0063-EJL, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43797 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2013). 
16. Scooter’s Pals Rescue v. Cnty. of Placer, No. 2:12–cv–01736–TLN–
KLN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157819 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013). 
 
Impracticability of Performance 
 
1. Gravel Express, Inc. v. Meadow Valley Contrs., Nos. 98-17066 & 98-
17227, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS (9th Cir. June 30, 2000). 
2. Cape-France Enters v. In re Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001). 
3. Peoplesoft U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
4. Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 112 Wash. App. 1001 
(2002). 
5. Evans v. Spokane, 112 Wash. App. 1059 (2002). 
6. Carsh v. Chaparral Pines, L.L.C., No. 2 CA-CV 2002-0175, 2003 Ariz. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 59 (Aug. 4, 2003). 
7. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Communs., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214 
(D. Haw. 2003). 
8. Lockheed Martin Idaho Techs. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Advanced 
Envtl. Sys., No. CIV. 98-0316-E-BLW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24460 
(D. Idaho Oct. 29, 2004).  
9. Nielsen Bros. v. Solid Trading, Ltd., No. 52535-2-I, 2004 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2769 (Nov. 15, 2004). 
10. Landover Corp. v. Bellevue Master, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1845 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 252 F. App’x 800 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
11. Dalkilic v. Titan Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 
12. United States v. Pflueger, No. CR 10-00631-02 LEK, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46784 (D. Haw. June 27, 2007). 
13. Coll. of the Sequoias Farm v. White Gold Ass’n, No. 1:07-CV-00014 
AWINEW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49315 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2007). 
14. Manay v. Academic Exch., No. C07-5071 RBL, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30531(W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2008). 
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15. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. City of Glendale, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
68112 (D. Or. May 22, 2009), report and recommendation adopted in 
part, rejected in part, No. CIV.05-1321-PK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61083 (D. Or. July 15, 2009). 
16. Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 96 Cal. 
Rptr. 813 (Ct. App. 2009). 
17. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ash Org., No. 09-CV-188-MO, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66542 (D. Or. July 1, 2010). 
18. Aleut Enter., LLC v. Adak Seafood, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0017-RRB, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92132 (D. Alaska Sept. 2, 2010). 
19. Max Baer Prods., Ltd. v. Riverwood Partners, LLC, No. 309-CV-
00512-RCJRAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100325 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 
2010). 
20. M & I Bank, FSB v. Coughlin, No. CV 09-02282-PHX-NVW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130638 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 2011). 
21. Bean v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 11-CV-553-PHX-
GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 476 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2012). 
22. Reader v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP, No. CV 11-02461-PHX-
FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4899 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2012), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom, 582 F. App’x 719 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
23. Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1035 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013). 
24. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. v. Hawks Prairie Inv., LLC, No. 11-CV-5973-
RBL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85776 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 2013). 
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Appendix 2: Summary of Captured Cases by Substantive Category 
 
7th Circuit Cases 
 
Real Property (21) 
 
1. Krilich v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002). 
2. Cohen Dev. Co. v. JMJ Props. Inc., 317 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003). 
3. Bennett v. Truttman, H024877, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1648 
(Feb. 24, 2004). 
4. Bennett v. Broderick, 858 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
5. Fritsch v. Premier Investors, LLC, 2006 WI App 130, 294 Wis.2d 699, 
717 N.W.2d 854 (2006). 
6. Taake v. Cnty. of Monroe, No. 06-579-GPM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17106 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007), vacated on other grounds, 530 F.3d 538 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
7. Knight v. Kadish, 1:05-cv-0077-TAB-RLY, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47133 (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2007). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
8. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
a.This case was counted in offer, acceptance and 
modification, because it addressed all three doctrines. 
9. Ner Tamid Congregation of N. Town v. Krivoruchko, No. 08 C 1261, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58318 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009). 
10. Fiduciary Real Estate Dev., Inc. v. Goodavage, 808 N.W.2d 742 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
11. Prospect Enters., L.L.C. v. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74099 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2011). 
12. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc., No. 09 C 4963, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21258 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2011). 
13. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012). 
14. Urban Sites of Chi., LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 979 N.E.2d 480 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2012). 
15. Acevedo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11 C 4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106461 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2012). 
16. McGann v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46484 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013). 
17. Baehl v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-RLY-WGH, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013). 




1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
a.This case was counted in offer, acceptance and duress, 
because it addressed all three doctrines. 
2. McGrath v. Aon Re, Inc., No. 99C2727, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12618 
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2000). 
3. Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chic. & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 
226 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2000). 
4. In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 310 B.R. 893 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
5. Zusy v. Int’l Med. Group, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
6. Hal Wagner Studios, Inc. v. Elliott, No. 09-CV-0031-MJR, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8892 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009). 
7. Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Wis. 2009), aff’d, 
658 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2010). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
 
Sale of Goods (9) 
 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
2. Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002). 
3. Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03 C 2265, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18830 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2004). 
4. Carnes Co. v. Stone Creek Mech., Inc., 412 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2005). 
5. Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, 290 Wis.2d 264, 
714 N.W.2d 530 (2006). 
6. Exelon Generation Co. v. Gen. Atomics Techs. Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 
892 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
7. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chi. Imp., Inc., No. 07 C 699, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
85443 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
8. Silverado Group, LLC v. Ed’s Towing, Inc., No. 2-12-0629, 2012 IL 
App (2d) LEXIS 120629-U (Dec. 24, 2012). 
9. BRC Rubber & Plastics v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d 862 




1. Leavitt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04 C 7451, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13004 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007). 
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2. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-cv-5415, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29582 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d sub 
nom., Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 
897 (7th Cir. 2011). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
3. Stopka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 10C6034, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 113713 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2011). 
4. Claire’s Stores, Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., No. 11CV2463, 2012 
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 30477 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 7, 2012). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 




1. Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Universal Constr. Maint. Integration 
Co., B144260, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4696 (Jan. 22, 2002). 
2. L.B. Foster Co. v. Tie & Track Sys., No. 07C3692, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26962 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
 
Credit Cards (1) 
 





1. Putz v. Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
2. Mitchell v. Mitchell, Nos. 2-13-0303 & 2-13-0363, cons., 2013 Ill. App. 




1. 737 N. Mich. Ave. Investors LLC v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., No. 
06C6379, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26079 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2007). 
 
Miscellaneous Services (14) 
 
1. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404 (7th Cir. 2002) (customer 
service agreement/phone contract). 
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a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
2. Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002)  (rehabilitation services). 
3. McBride v. St. Anthony Messenger Magazine, No. 2:02-CV-0237-JDT-
WTL, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6449 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2003) (sale of 
subscriptions). 
4. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Jet Messenger Serv., 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25421 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2003) (services contract). 
5. In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 310 B.R. 905 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(printing/publishing contract). 
6. Vill. of S. Elgin v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004) (waste disposal/landfill contract). 
7. AT&T Corp. v. Douglas-Hanson Co., No. 05-C-266-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24801 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2005) (install special computer 
cable). 
8. United States ex rel. Countryside Indus. v. Integrated Constr. Tech. 
Corp., No. 07CV2633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76008 (N.D. Ill.Sept. 
28, 2007) (landscaping subcontract). 
9. Estate of Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 
(consulting contract/negotiate mining rights). 
10. Sys. Dev. Integration, LLC v. Computer Scis. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 2d 
1063 (N.D. Ill.2010) (technology). 
11. Bear Dev., LLC v. City of Kenosha, 822 F.Supp. 2d 865 (E.D.Wis. 
2011) (environmental remediation). 
12. Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Group, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770 (N.D. 
Ill. 2011)  (online marketing contracts). 
13. Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 11 C 9288, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94095, (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 764 F.3d 765 




1. Falconbridge U.S., Inc. v. Bank One Ill., N.A., 227 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 
2000) (bankruptcy/Article 9 priority). 
2. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (stock purchase 
agreement). 
3. Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Patel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. Ill. 2000) 
(franchise agreement). 
4. DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (sale of pizza 
business). 
5. Sub-Zero Freezer Co. v. Cunard Line Ltd., No. 01-C-0664-C, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27142 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2002) (cruise ship bookings). 
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6. Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. 2005) (guarantee). 
7. Finnin v. Bob Lindsay, Inc., 852 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (sale of 
car dealership). 
8. Grogg v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 1:05-CV-415 TS, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51662 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2006) (rental 
car/insurance/personal injury contract). 
9. Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Asperger Caraher LLC, No. 05 C 5624, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81112 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2006) (partnership 
dissolution agreement). 
10. United States v. Fletcher, No. 06 C 6056, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3555 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009) (tax 
refund). 
11. Catapult Commc’n Corp. v. Foster, No. 06C6112, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94922 (N.D. Ill.Sept. 13, 2010) (indemnity agreement). 
12. Genzyme Corp. v. Disc. Drugs Wis., Inc., No. 08 C 5151, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18356 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010) (drug rebate program). 
13. Brenner v. Greenberg, No. 08 C 826, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120614 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2010) (settlement and release). 
14. ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 961 
(N.D. Ill. 2010) (sanctioning fees). 
15. Lawrence Crawford Ass’n v. Conversource, Inc., No. 5-11-0061, 2012 
Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1966 (Aug. 15, 2012) (equipment lease). 
16. Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc. v. M.D.1, LLC, No. 11 C 2593, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 151223 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2012) (Howard Johnson 
license agreement). 
17. Williams v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28074 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013) (overdraft fees). 
18. U.S. CFTC v. Tunney & Assocs., No. 13 CV 2919, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123124 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) (tolling agreement). 
a.This case was counted in both offer and acceptance, 
because it addressed both doctrines. 
 
9th Circuit Cases 
 
Real Property (44) 
 
1. Saluteen-Maschersky v. Countrywide Funding Corp., 22 P.3d 804 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
2. Cape-France Enters v. In re Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001). 
3. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657 
(Alaska 2002), remanded by, Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. State, 215 
P.3d 333 (Alaska 2009). 
4. Evans v. Spokane, 112 Wash. App. 1059 (2002). 
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5. WMW L.L.C. v. Winton, B162872, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1590 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
6. Bennett v. Truttman, H024877, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1648 
(Feb. 24, 2004). 
7. Nielsen Bros. v. Solid Trading, Ltd., No. 52535-2-I, 2004 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2769 (Nov. 15, 2004). 
8. Ken Hood Constr. Co. v. Pac. Coast Constr., Inc., 120 P.3d 6 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
9. Namdar v. Koop, No. G032726, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2087 
(Mar. 8, 2005). 
10. Johnston v. Moreli, F046348, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4920 
(June 8, 2006). 
11. Earls v. Corning, 143 P.3d 243 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
12. Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC, 161 P.3d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
13. Womack v. Bank of Am., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 909 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
14. Goodman v. Lothrop, 151 P.3d 818 (Idaho 2007). 
15. Landover Corp. v. Bellevue Master, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
1845 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 252 F. App’x 800 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
16. Shikwan Sung v. Hamilton, 676 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Haw. 2009). 
17. Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 96 
Cal.Rptr. 813 (Ct. App. 2009). 
18. Evans v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 2:09-cv-02401-RLH-LRL, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63410 (D. Nev. June 18, 2010). 
19. Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Or. 
2010) 
20. Chan v. Lund, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 122 (Ct. App. 2010). 
21. Aleut Enter., LLC v. Adak Seafood, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0017-RRB, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92132 (D. Alaska Sept. 2, 2010). 
22. Max Baer Prods., Ltd. v. Riverwood Partners, LLC, No. 309-CV-
00512-RCJRAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100325 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 
2010). 
23. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ash Org., No. 09-CV-188-MO, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66542 (D. Or. July 1, 2010). 
24. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49698 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011). 
25. FDIC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. SACV 10-0713 DOC (MLGx), 
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4. Wessa v. Watermark Paddlesports, Inc., No. C06-5156 FDB, 2006 U.S. 
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Appendix 3: Easy In 
 
7th Circuit Cases 
 
Offer (Total Cases = 14) 
 
Contract Formed (9) 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059-60 (S.D. Ind. 
2000). 
2. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 414-415 (7th Cir. 2002). 
3. In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 310 B.R. 893, 899 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004). 
4. Bennett v. Broderick, 858 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
5. Knight v. Kadish, No. 1:05-CV-0077TAB-RLY, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47133, at *12 (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2007). 
6. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 366 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
7. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chi. Imp., Inc., No. 07 C 699, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
85443, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). 
8. Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 891, 898 (W.D. Wis. 2009), 
aff’d, 658 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2010). 
9. U.S. CFTC v. Tunney & Assocs., No. 13 CV 2919, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123124, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013). 
 
Contract Not Formed (5) 
1. Cohen Dev. Co. v. JMJ Props. Inc., 317 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 2003). 
2. Vill. of S. Elgin v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658, 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004). 
3. L.B. Foster Co. v. Tie & Track Sys. Inc., No. 07 C 3692, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26962, at *11-12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009). 
4. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-cv-5415, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29582 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d sub 
nom., Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 
897, 902 (7th Cir. 2011). 
5. Claire’s Stores, Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., No. 11 CV 2463, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30477, at *27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2012). 
 
Acceptance (Total Cases = 29) 
 
Contract Formed (16) 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1060 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
2. Falconbridge U.S., Inc. v. Bank One Ill., N.A., 227 F.3d 928, 933 (7th 
Cir. 2000). 
3. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 415 (7th Cir. 2002). 
HART_23 (DUKANOVIC) 8/27/2015 9:57 PM 
 
4. Bennett v. Truttman, H024877, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1648, at 
*20 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
5. Tickanen v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 461 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (E.D. Wis. 
2006). 
6. Bennett v. Broderick, 858 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
7. 737 N. Mich. Ave. Investors LLC v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., No. 
06C6379, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26079, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 
2007). 
8. Knight v. Kadish, 1:05-cv-0077-TAB-RLY, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47133, at *16 (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2007). 
9. Ind. BMV v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). 
10. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chi. Import, Inc., No. 07C699, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 85443, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009). 
11. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 
05-cv-5415, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29582 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010), 
aff’d sub nom., Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Cigna Corp., 
665 F.3d 897, 904 (7th Cir. 2011). 
12. Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Wis. 2009), aff’d, 
658 F.3d 675, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2010). 
13. Stopka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 10C6034, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 113713, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2011). 
14. Bear Dev., LLC v. City of Kenosha, 822 F. Supp. 2d 865, 871 (E.D. 
Wis. 2011). 
15. U.S. CFTC v. Tunney & Assocs., P.C., No. 13cv2919, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123124, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013). 
16. Mitchell v. Mitchell, Nos. 2-13-0303 & 2-13-0363, cons., 2013 Ill. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 2619, at ¶ 35 (Nov. 20, 2013). 
 
Contract Not Formed (13) 
1. McGrath v. Aon Re, Inc., No. 99C2727, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12618, 
at *9 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2000). 
2. Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Universal Constr. Maint. Integration 
Co., B144260, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4696, at *16 (Jan. 22, 
2002). 
3. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Jet Messenger Serv., 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25421, at *16 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2003). 
4. Finnin v. Bob Lindsay, Inc., 852 N.E.2d 446, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). 
5. Taake v. Cnty. of Monroe, No. 06-579-GPM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17106, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007), vacated on other grounds, 530 
F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 2008). 
6. United States ex rel. Countryside Indus. v. Integrated Constr. Tech. 
Corp., No. 07CV2633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76008, at *11-12 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 28, 2007). 
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7. Estate of Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652, 658 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 
8. L.B. Foster Co. v. Tie & Track Sys., No. 07C3692, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26962, at *15-16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009). 
9. Sys. Dev. Integration, LLC v. Computer Scis. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 2d 
1063, 1081 (N.D. Ill.2010). 
10. Catapult Commc’n Corp. v. Foster, No. 06C6112, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94922, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2010). 
11. Fiduciary Real Estate Dev., Inc. v. Goodavage, 2011 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 1023, at ¶ 8 (Dec. 22, 2011). 
12. Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Group, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789 
(N.D. Ill. 2011). 
13. Claire’s Stores, Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., No. 11CV2463, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30477, at *30 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2012). 
 
Modification (Total Cases = 22) 
 
Contract Formed (13) 
1. DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
2. Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2002). 
3. Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751, 759 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
4. Carnes Co. v. Stone Creek Mech., Inc., 412 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
5. Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., N.W.2d 530, 542 (Wis. 2006). 
6. Fritsch v. Premier Investors, LLC, No. 2006AP103-FT, 2006 Wisc. 
App. LEXIS 252, at *10 (May 26, 2006). 
7. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 366 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
8. Hal Wagner Studios, Inc. v. Elliott, No. 09-CV-0031-MJR, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8892, at *29 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009). 
9. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 562 (7th Cir. 2012). 
10. Urban Sites of Chi., LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 979 N.E.2d 480, 492 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
11. Silverado Group, LLC v. Ed’s Towing, Inc., No. 2-12-0629, 2012 IL 
App (2d) 120629-U, at ¶ 32 (Dec. 24, 2012) (LEXIS). 
12. Williams v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28074, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013). 
13. Large v. Mobile Tool Int’l, Inc., 724 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 
Contract Not Formed (9) 
1. Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154, 161 (Ind. 2005). 
2. AT&T Corp. v. Douglas-Hanson Co., No. 05-C-266-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24801, at *13 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2005). 
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3. Grogg v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 1:05-CV-415 TS, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51662, at *15 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2006). 
4. Leavitt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04 C 7451, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13004, at *31 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007). 
5. Zusy v. Int’l Med. Group, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1093 (S.D. Ind. 
2007). 
6. Genzyme Corp. v. Disc. Drugs Wis., Inc., No. 08 C 5151, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18356, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010). 
7. Acevedo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11 C 4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106461, at *19 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2012). 
8. McGann v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46484, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013). 
9. Baehl v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-RLY-WGH, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445, at *17 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013). 
 
9th Circuit Cases 
Offer (Total Cases = 15) 
 
Contract Formed (2) 
1. Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702, 713 (Cal. 2001). 
2. Williams Bros. Construction, L.L.C. v. Baltrusch Inc., 2004 Mont. Dist. 
LEXIS 3042, at ¶ 25 (2004). 
 
Contract Not Formed (13) 
1. Saluteen-Maschersky v. Countrywide Funding Corp., 22 P.3d 804, 855 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
2. Sarafa v. PC Quote, Inc., No. D036652, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1229, at *29 (Nov. 28, 2001). 
3. Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 47 P.3d 1222, 1237 (Haw. 2002). 
4. Andrus v. Wash. Dep’t of Transp., 117 P.3d 1152, 1154 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
5. Lexington Precision Corp. v. Autoliv Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2005-0187, 
2006 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 434, at ¶ 26 (2006). 
6. Amber Chem., Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 106CV06090OWWSMS, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451, at *14 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
7. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., No. C 06-2572 
SBA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116080, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 
2009). 
8. Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010). 
9. Laguerre v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 3:10-CV-452-ECR-VPC, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131100, at *9-10 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2010). 
10. Holland v. BP Am., Inc., No. CIV S-11-0580-KJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30204, at *17-18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012). 
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11. Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt., No. SACV 12-0009 DOC, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012). 
12. Frezza v. Google Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57462, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 22, 2013). 
13. Cheren v. Compass Bank, No. CV-12-00206-PHX-JAT, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 118804, at *11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2013). 
 
Acceptance (Total Cases = 24) 
 
Contract Formed (11) 
1. Gray v. Stewart, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217, 220 (Ct. App. 2002). 
2. Leon v. Sharp Health Care, D040042, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
4910, at *8 (May 20, 2003). 
3. Bennett v. Truttman, H024877, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1648, at 
*23 (Feb. 24, 2004). 
4. Ken Hood Constr. Co. v. Pac. Coast Constr., Inc., 120 P.3d 6, 12 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
5. Earls v. Corning, 143 P.3d 243, 247 (Or. Ct. App. 2006). 
6. Gabriel v. Ailing House Pest Control, Inc., H029300, 2007 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 3454, at *16 (Apr. 30, 2007). 
7. Attachmate Corp. v. Health Net, Inc., No. C09-1161 MJP, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114445, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2010). 
8. Lietz v. Hansen Law Offices, PSC, 271 P.3d 899, 908 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2011). 
9. Gardenias v. Candreva, B223556, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1884, 
at *9-10 (Mar. 14, 2011). 
10. Mills v. Budil, No. 41586-1-II, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 739, at *12 
(Mar. 27, 2012). 
11. DC Media Capital v. Imagine Fulfillment Servs., B239081, 2013 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 6256, at *11 (Aug. 30, 2013). 
 
Contract Not Formed (13) 
1. Hoseth v. Masonic Temple Ass’n, No. 19842-1-III, 2001 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2156, at *7 (Sept. 27, 2001). 
2. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P. 3d 
657, 665 (Alaska 2002), remanded by, Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. 
State, 215 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2009). 
3. WMW L.L.C. v. Winton, B162872, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1590, at *22 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
4. Johnston v. Moreli, F046348, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4920, at 
*23 (June 8, 2006). 
5. Beretta v. Tucson Trap & Skeet Club, 2 CA-CV 2007-0009, 2007 Ariz. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 1260, at *10 (Aug. 16, 2007). 
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6. Veith v. Xterra Wetsuits, L.L.C., 183 P.3d 334, 366-67 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2008). 
7. Shikwan Sung v. Hamilton, 676 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1003 (D. Haw. 2009). 
8. Castle v. Imagine Audio Video, L.L.C., 1 CA-CV 10-0427, 2011 Ariz. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 781, at *18 (May 24, 2011). 
9. Fuller v. Monogram Real Estate, G044514, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 9647, at *6 (Dec. 19, 2011). 
10. Nascimento v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 2:11-CV-1049 JCM (GWF), 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160301, at *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 8, 2012). 
11. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 282 P.3d 359 (Alaska 
2012). 
12. Duncan v. Lifelock, Inc., 1 CA-CV 12-0546, 2013 Ariz. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 744, at *8 (July 2, 2013). 
13. Arreola v. Napole, B239467, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7346, at 
*15 (Oct. 15, 2013). 
 
Modification (Total Cases = 23) 
 
Contract Formed (4) 
1. Flores v. Jewels Mktg. & Agribusiness, No. CIV F 07-334 AWI WMW, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53127, at *25 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2007). 
2. Sociedad Aeronautica De, Santander S.A. v. Weber, No. CV 09-103-
M-DWM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71349, at *5 (D. Mont. July 14, 
2010). 
3. Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1001, 1013 
(2012). 
4. Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B243614, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 789, at *39-40 (Jan. 30, 2014). 
 
Contract Not Formed (19) 
1. Smith v. Solo Watersports, Inc., No. 49064-8-I, 2002 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 1811, at *12 (July 29, 2002). 
2. Shea v. Household Bank (SB), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387, 389 (Ct. App. 
2003).  
3. Gillani Consulting Inc. v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., No. C05-
0823-JCC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88704, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 
2006), aff’d 300 F. App’x 466 (9th. Cir. 2008). 
4. Wessa v. Watermark Paddlesports, Inc., No. C06-5156 FDB, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 51757, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2006). 
5. Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC, 161 P.3d 473, 480 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
6. Womack v. Bank of Am., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 909, at *15 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
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7. Evans v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 2:09-cv-02401-RLH-LRL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63410, at *11 (D. Nev. June 18, 2010). 
8. Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177 (D. 
Or. 2010). 
9. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49698, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011). 
10. FDIC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. SACV 10-0713 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94842, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). 
11. Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B227388, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8055, at *11-12 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
12. AAA Constr. of Missoula v. Choice Land Corp., 264 P.3d 709, 714 
(Mont. 2011). 
13. Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 442, 447 (Ct. 
App. 2011), modified by, No. B230580, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 1504 
(Dec. 1, 2011). 
14. Soin v. Fannie Mae, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51824, at *15 (E.D. Cal. 
Apr. 12, 2012). 
15. Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B237831, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8285, at *17 (Nov. 14, 2012). 
16. Juarez v. Suntrust Mortg., No. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67850, at *46 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2013). 
17. Toneman v. U.S. Bank, No. CV 12-09369-MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 84240, at *20-21 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013). 
18. Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34322, at *39-40 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013). 
19. Dragicevich v. Chase Home Fin., No. CV 12-8192 ABC (MANx), 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112208, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013). 
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Appendix 4: Difficult Out 
 
7th Circuit Cases 
 
Duress (Total Cases = 10) 
 
Performance Discharged (0) 
 
Performance Not Discharged (10) 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1062 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
2. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 387 (7th Cir. 2000).  
3. Krilich v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153, 1163 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2002). 
4. Putz v. Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
5. McBride v. St. Anthony Messenger Magazine, No. 2:02-CV-0237-JDT-
WTL, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6449, at *21-22 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2003). 
6. In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 310 B.R. 905, 919 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).  
7. Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Asperger Caraher LLC, No. 05 C 5624, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81112, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2006). 
8. United States v. Fletcher, No. 06 C 6056, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3555, 
at *33-34 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2009). 
9. ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 961, 
974 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
10. Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 11 C 9288, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94095, at *8-9 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), rev’d and remanded on other 
grounds, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 
Impracticability (Total Cases = 12) 
 
Performance Discharged (0) 
 
Performance Not Discharged (12) 
1. Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chi. & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 
226 F.3d 535, 546 (7th Cir. 2000). 
2. Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Patel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 928, 933-34 (C.D. Ill. 
2000). 
3. Sub-Zero Freezer Co. v. Cunard Line Ltd., No. 01-C-0664-C, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27142, at *16 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2002). 
4. Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03 C 2265, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18830, at *36-37 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2004). 
5. Exelon Generation Co. v. Gen. Atomics Techs. Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 
892, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
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6. Ner Tamid Congregation of N. Town v. Krivoruchko, No. 08 C 1261, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58318, at *59 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2009). 
7. Brenner v. Greenberg, No. 08 C 826, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120614, at 
*17-19 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2010). 
8. Prospect Enters., L.L.C. v. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74099,  at *19 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2011). 
9. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc., No. 09 C 4963, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21258, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2011).  
10. Lawrence Crawford Ass’n v. Conversource, Inc., No. 5-11-0061, 2012 
Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1966, at *14 (Aug. 15, 2012). 
11. Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc. v. M.D.1, LLC, No. 11 C 2593, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 151223, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2012). 
12. BRC Rubber & Plastics v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d 862, 
877 (N.D. Ind. 2013). 
 
Modification (Total Cases =22) 
 
Performance Discharged (13) 
1. DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). 
2. Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 298 (7th Cir. 2002). 
3. Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751, 758-59 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2002). 
4. Carnes Co. v. Stone Creek Mech., Inc., 412 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 
2005). 
5. Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 2006 WI 46, 290 Wis.2d 264, 
283, 714 N.W.2d 530, 540 (2006). 
6. Fritsch v. Premier Investors, LLC, 2006 WI App 130, 294 Wis.2d 699, 
717 N.W.2d 854 (2006). 
7. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 366 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008). 
8. Hal Wagner Studios, Inc. v. Elliott, No. 09-CV-0031-MJR, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8892, at *21-23 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009). 
9. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 561-66 (7th Cir. 2012). 
10. Urban Sites of Chi., LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 979 N.E.2d 480, 493, 
496  (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) 
11. Silverado Group, LLC v. Ed’s Towing, Inc., No. 2-12-0629, 2012 IL 
App (2d). 120629-U, at *33 (Dec. 24, 2012) (LEXIS). 
12. Williams v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28074, at *30-31 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013). 
13. Large v. Mobile Tool Int’l, Inc., 724 F.3d 766, 772 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 
Performance Not Discharged (9) 
1. Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154, 161 (Ind. 2005). 
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2. AT&T Corp. v. Douglas-Hanson Co., No. 05-C-266-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24801, at *11 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2005). 
3. Grogg v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 1:05-CV-415 TS, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51662, at *15 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2006). 
4. Leavitt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04 C 7451, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13004, at *27, 31 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007). 
5. Zusy v. Int’l Med. Group, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1095, 1097 (S.D. 
Ind. 2007). 
6. Genzyme Corp. v. Disc. Drugs Wis., Inc., No. 08 C 5151, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18356, at *13-14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010). 
7. Acevedo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11 C 4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106461, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2012). 
8. McGann v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46484, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013). 
9. Baehl v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-RLY-WGH, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445, at *32-33 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013). 
 
9th Circuit Cases 
 
Duress (Total Cases = 16) 
 
Performance Discharged (1) 
1. Flower v. Pep Boys, No. D040667, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
8095, at *31 (Aug. 26, 2003). 
 
Performance Not Discharged (15) 
1. Morrow v. Am. Int’l Grp., No. B144474, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 3120, at *35 (Mar. 13, 2002). 
2. Yemen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B144230, 2002 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2181, at *24 (Apr. 11, 2002).  
3. Dodi v. Am. Online, Inc., No. B158161, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
4085, at *16-17 (Apr. 24, 2003). 
4. Smith v. Rosenberg, No. E034199, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
6189, at *18 (June 29, 2004). 
5. Namdar v. Koop, No. G032726, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2087, 
at *32 (Mar. 8, 2005). 
6. S & W Seed Co. v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. F043771, 2005 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 11723, at *20-21 (Dec. 20, 2005). 
7. Goodman v. Lothrop, 151 P.3d 818, 823 (Idaho 2007).  
8. Perez v. Uline, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 876-77 (Ct. App. 2007). 
9. Murray v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, No. A117596, 2008 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 7864, at *16 (Sept. 15, 2008). 
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10. Insitu, Inc. v. Kent, No. CV-08-3067-EFS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61190, at *13 (E.D. Wash. June 17, 2009), aff’d, 388 F. App’x 745 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
11. In re Moonlight Basin Ranch LP, No. 09-62327-11, 2010 Bankr. 
LEXIS 2198, at *107 (Bankr. Dist. Mont. June 25, 2010). 
12. Steinman v. Malamed, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 304, 310 (Ct. App. 2010).  
13. Chan v. Lund, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 135 (Ct. App. 2010). 
14. Mortensen v. First Am. Title Co., No. 2:11-CV-0063-EJL, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43797, at *24 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2013). 
15. Scooter’s Pals Rescue v. Cnty. of Placer, No. 2:12–cv–01736–TLN–
KLN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157819, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013). 
 
Impracticability (Total Cases = 24) 
 
Performance Discharged (6) 
1. Cape-France Enters v. In re Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1016 (Mont. 
2001). 
2. Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 112 Wash. App. 1001, 
at *3 (2002). 
3. Evans v. Spokane, 112 Wash. App. 1059, at *7 (2002). 
4. United States v. Pflueger, No. CR 10-00631-02 LEK, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46784, at *9 (D. Haw. June 27, 2007). 
5. Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 96 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 813, 843 (Ct. App. 2009). 
6. Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1035, at *21 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013). 
 
Performance Not Discharged (18) 
1. Gravel Express, Inc. v. Meadow Valley Contrs., 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15720, at *8 (9th Cir. Ariz. June 30, 2000). 
2. Peoplesoft U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 
(N.D. Cal. 2002). 
3. Carsh v. Chaparral Pines, L.L.C., No. 2 CA-CV 2002-0175, 2003 Ariz. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *13 (2003). 
4. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Communs., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 
1225 (D. Haw. 2003). 
5. Lockheed Martin Idaho Techs. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Advanced 
Envtl. Sys., No. CIV. 98-0316-E-BLW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24460, 
at *92 (D. Idaho Oct. 29, 2004).  
6. Nielsen Bros. v. Solid Trading, Ltd., No. 52535-2-I, 2004 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2769, at *11 (Nov. 15, 2004). 
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7. Landover Corp. v. Bellevue Master, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1845, 
at *43-44 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 252 F. App’x 800 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
8. Dalkilic v. Titan Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1197-98 (S.D. Cal. 2007). 
9. Coll. of the Sequoias Farm v. White Gold Ass’n, No. 1:07-CV-00014 
AWINEW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49315, at *43 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 
2007). 
10. Manay v. Academic Exch., No. C07-5071 RBL, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30531, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2008). 
11. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. City of Glendale, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
68112, at *52 (D. Or. May 22, 2009), report and recommendation 
adopted in part, rejected in part, No. CIV.05-1321-PK, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 61083 (D. Or. July 15, 2009). 
12. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ash Org., No. 09-CV-188-MO, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66542, at *18-19 (D. Or. July 1, 2010). 
13. Aleut Enter., LLC v. Adak Seafood, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0017-RRB, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92132, at *7 (D. Ala. Sept. 2, 2010). 
14. Max Baer Prods., Ltd. v. Riverwood Partners, LLC, No. 309-CV-
00512-RCJRAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100325, at *10 (D. Nev. 
Sept. 17, 2010). 
15. M & I Bank, FSB v. Coughlin, No. CV 09-02282-PHX-NVW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130638, at *20 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 2011). 
16. Bean v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 11-CV-553-PHX-
GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 476, at *14 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2012). 
17. Reader v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP, No. CV 11-02461-PHX-
FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4899, at *13 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2012), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom, 582 F. App’x 719 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
18. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. v. Hawks Prairie Inv., LLC, No. 11-CV-5973-
RBL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85776, at *34 (W.D. Wash. June 18, 
2013). 
 
Modification (Total Cases = 23) 
 
Performance Discharged (4) 
1. Flores v. Jewels Mktg. & Agribusiness, No. CIV F 07-334 AWI WMW, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53127, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2007). 
2. Sociedad Aeronautica De, Santander S.A. v. Weber, No. CV 09-103-
M-DWM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71349, at *5 (D. Mont. July 14, 
2010). 
3. Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 98 (Ct. 
App. 2012). 
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4. Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B243614, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 789, at *45 (Jan. 30, 2014). 
 
Performance Not Discharged (19) 
1. Smith v. Solo Watersports, Inc., No. 49064-8-I, 2002 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 1811, at *12-13 (July 29, 2002). 
2. Shea v. Household Bank (SB), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387, 389 (Ct. App. 
2003).  
3. Gillani Consulting Inc. v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., No. C05-
0823-JCC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88704, at *22 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 
2006), aff’d 300 F. App’x 466 (9th. Cir. 2008). 
4. Wessa v. Watermark Paddlesports, Inc., No. C06-5156 FDB, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 51757, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2006). 
5. Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC, 161 P.3d 473, 480 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
6. Womack v. Bank of Am., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 909, at *9 (Nov. 20, 2007). 
7. Evans v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 2:09-cv-02401-RLH-LRL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63410, at *11 (D. Nev. June 18, 2010). 
8. Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1174 (D. 
Or. 2010). 
9. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49698, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011). 
10. FDIC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. SACV 10-0713 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94842, at *21 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011). 
11. Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B227388, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8055, at *11 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
12. AAA Constr. of Missoula v. Choice Land Corp., 264 P.3d 709, 714 
(Mont. 2011). 
13. Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 447 
(Ct. App. 2011), modified by No. B230580, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 
1504 (Dec. 1, 2011). 
14. Soin v. Fannie Mae, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51824, at *15 (E.D. Cal. 
Apr. 12, 2012). 
15. Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B237831, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8285, at *15 (Nov. 14, 2012). 
16. Juarez v. Suntrust Mortg., No. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67850, at *45-46 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2013). 
17. Toneman v. U.S. Bank, No. CV 12-09369-MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 84240, at *20-21 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013). 
18. Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34322, at *42 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013). 
19. Dragicevich v. Chase Home Fin., No. CV 12-8192 ABC (MANx), 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112208, at *10-11 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013). 
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Appendix 5: Unconscionability 
 
Re: The Lexis/Nexis Search 
 
Search Terms: Unconscionability: (“Unconscionability” near/25 
contract) and (avoid! near/25 enforc!) 
 
Search Filters: The search was conducted on Lexis using the timeline of 
January 1, 2011 through March 1, 2014, and the following filters: 
Jurisdiction: 9th Circuit, Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington.  
 
Arbitration Clause Cases—Clause Enforceable 
 
1. Coup v. Scottsdale Plaza Resort, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 931, 955 (D. 
Ariz. 2011). 
2. Grabowski v. C.H. Robinson Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1179 (S.D. Cal. 
2011). 
3. L & M Creations, Inc. v. CRC Info. Sys., No. 2:10-cv-00685-GMN-
GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36269, at *20 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2011). 
4. Koffler Elec. Mech. Apparatus Repair, Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 
No. C-11-0052 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34851, at *22 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 24, 2011). 
5. Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 150 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 860 (Ct. App. 2012), 
review granted, 296 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2013). 
6. Luchini v. Carmax, Inc., No. CV F 12-0417 LJO DLB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 102198, at *32-34 (E.D. Cal. July 23, 2012). 
7. Stacy v. Brinker Rest. Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00851-LJO-BAM, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 150345, at *31-32 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2012). 
8. Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A., 673 F.3d 947, 964 (9th Cir. 2012). 
9. Rosendahl v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26139, at 
*30 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2012). 
10. Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 841 
(N.D. Cal. 2012). 
11. Lara v. Onsite Health, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 831, 848 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
12. Reid v. Optumhealth Care Solutions, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00747-ST, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184214, at *22 (D. Or. Oct. 11, 2012). 
13. Vasquez v. Greene Motors, Inc., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 798 (Ct. App. 
2013), review granted, 302 P.3d 573 (Cal. 2013). 
14. Flores v. West Covina Auto Grp, LLC, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 481, 499-500 
(Ct. App. 2013), review granted, 297 P.3d 884 (Cal. 2013). 
15. Leos v. Darden Rests., Inc., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384, 390 (Ct. App. 
2013), review granted, 307 P.3d 878 (Cal. 2013). 
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16. Bigler v. Harker Sch., 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78, 86-87 (Ct. App. 2013). 
17. King v. Hausfeld, No. C-13-0237 EMC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51116, 
at *54 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013). 
18. Serpa v. Cal. Sur. Investigations, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 518 (Ct. 
App. 2013). 
19. McIntosh v. Adventist Health/West St. Hosp., No. C 12-05589 PJH, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34328, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013). 
20. Mercado v. Doctors Med. Ctr. of Modesto, Inc., No. F064478, 2013 
Cal. App. LEXIS 5303, at *25 (July 26, 2013). 
21. Nibler v. Monex Deposit Co., No. G046511, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 3363, at *17 (May 13, 2013). 
22. Uptown Drug Co. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 962 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 
1183 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
23. Brown v. Auto. Club of S. Cal., No. B241995, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 5410, at *8-9 (July 31, 2013). 
24. Peng v. First Republic Bank, 162 Cal. Rptr.3d 545, 554 (Ct. App. 
2013). 
25. Fimby-Christensen v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., Case No. 5:13-cv-
01007-EJD, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166647, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 
2013). 
26. Montes v. San Joaquin Cmty. Hosp., No. 1:13-cv-01722-AWT-JLT, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11252, at *43 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2014). 
27. Brookdale Inn & Spa v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 
Case No.: 5:13–CV–02559–EJD, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4008, at *18 
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014). 
28. Briede v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., Civil No. 10-649-HA, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 112563, at *9 (D. Or. Oct. 21, 2010). 
 
Arbitration Clause Cases—Clause Not Enforceable 
 
1. Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 19, 22 (Ct. App. 
2011), review granted, 272 P.3d 976 (Cal. 2012). 
2. Andrade v. Superior Court, No. H034960, 2011 Cal. App. LEXIS 3508, 
at *1 (May 10, 2011). 
3. Kanbar v. O’Melveny & Myers, 849 F. Supp. 2d 902, 910 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
4. Zullo v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461, 468 (Ct. App. 2011). 
5. Goodridge v. KDF Auto. Group, Inc., 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 16, 32 (Ct. 
App. 2012), review granted, 290 P.3d 1116 (Cal. 2012). 
6. Mayers v. Volt Mgmt. Corp., 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 660 (Ct. App. 
2012), review granted, 278 P.3d 1167 (Cal. 2012). 
7. Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 495 (Ct. 
App. 2012). 
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8. Vargas v. SAI Monrovia B, Inc., 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 742, 751 (Ct. App. 
2013), review granted, 304 P.3d 1082 (Cal. 2013). 
9. Natalini v. Import Motors, Inc., 153 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224, 234 (Ct. App. 
2013), review granted, 299 P.3d 700 (Cal. 2013). 
10. Vega v. Frandeli Grp. LLC, No. G047847, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 7464, at *1 (Oct. 17, 2013). 
11. Quinonez v. Empire Today, No. A134448, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 2053, at *17-18 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
 
Non-Arbitration Clause Cases 
 
1. Matson v. Dean, No. B234024, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6288 
(Aug. 28, 2012). 
2. Potter v. GE Capital, No. C13-1129RAJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13289 
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2014). 
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Appendix 6: Prevailing Parties by Doctrine—7th Circuit 
 
Offer (Total Cases = 14) 
 
Stronger Party (7) 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057-60 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(AerChem; corporation, employer, drafted the contract; Flynn: 
employee; Flynn argued no offer—Court held offer established). 
2. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 408-409, 414, 416 (7th Cir. 
2002) (AT&T; giant telecommunication provider; Boomer: customer; 
Boomer argued no offer—Court held offer established). 
3. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chi. Imp., Inc., No. 07 C 699, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
85443, at *4, *6, *13-14, *18-21 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009) (Jada Toys; 
large manufacturer, contracts were Jada Toys’ invoices; Chicago 
Imports: toy seller; Jada Toys argued offer—Court held offer 
established). 
4. Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 891, 894, 897-898 (W.D. Wis. 
2009), aff’d, 658 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2010) (Stryker Corp: corporation, 
employer, drafted contract; Carroll: employee; Stryker Corp. argued 
offer—Court held offer established). 
5. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Life Ins. Co., No. 05-cv-5415, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29582 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Cigna Corp., 665 F.3d 897 
(7th Cir. 2011). (Life Insurance Co.; insurance company, drafted 
policy; National Production Workers Union Insurance Trust: trust 
jointly set up by large union and employers with collective bargaining 
agreements with union; Workers Union argued offer—Court held no 
offer was established). 
6. Claire’s Stores, Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., No. 11 CV 2463, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30477, at *1, *2-3, *20, *27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2012) 
(Companion Ins. Co.: insurance company, drafted policy; Claire’s 
Stores: national retailer; Claire’s argued offer—Court held no offer 
established). 
7. U.S. CFTC v. Tunney & Assocs., No. 13 CV 2919, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123124, at *2, *6, *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) (US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: federal agency; Tunney & 
Associates: CPA firm; Tunney argued no offer—Court held offer 
established). 
 
Weaker Party (3) 
1. In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 310 B.R. 893, 895-896, 898-899 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2004) (David Azarla: employee; Pre-Press Graphics: 
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corporation; employer; Azarla argued offer—Court held offer 
established). 
2. Bennett v. Broderick, 858 N.E.2d 1044, 1046, 1048-1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006) (Brian Bennett: lessee; Carole Broderick: lessor; Broderick 
argued no offer—Court held offer established). 
3. Ind. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 362, 365-
366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (Ash, Inc.; landlord, property owner; 
Indiana BMV: state agency; Indiana BMV argued no offer—Court 
held offer established). 
 
Undesignated (4) 
1. Cohen Dev. Co. v. JMJ Props. Inc., 317 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2003) (both 
parties are corporations, both are land developers). 
2. Vill. of S. Elgin v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 810 N.E.2d 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004) (a City versus a large corporation and large landowner). 
3. Knight v. Kadish, No. 1:05-CV-0077TAB-RLY, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47133 (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2007) (both parties in business, both 
represented by attorneys). 
4. L.B. Foster Co. v. Tie & Track Sys. Inc., No. 07 C 3692, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26962 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (not enough information 
about each company). 
 
Acceptance (Total Cases = 29) 
 
Stronger Party (13) 
 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057-60 (S.D. Ind. 2000) 
(AerChem; corporation, employer, drafted the contract; Flynn: 
employee; Flynn argued no acceptance—Court held acceptance was 
established). 
2. McGrath v. Aon Re, Inc., No. 99C2727, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12618, 
at *1-3, *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2000) (Aon: corporation, employer; 
Thomas McGrath: employee; McGrath argued acceptance—Court 
held no acceptance established). 
3. Boomer v. AT&T Corp., 309 F.3d 404, 408-409, 414-415 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(AT&T; giant telecommunication provider; Boomer: customer; 
Boomer argued no acceptance—Court held acceptance established). 
4. Tickanen v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 461 F. Supp. 2d 863, 865-867 (E.D. 
Wis. 2006) (Harris & Harris: assignee of credit card issuers; Helen 
Tickanen et al: credit card holders; Tickanen argued no acceptance—
Court held acceptance established). 
5. Taake v. Cnty. of Monroe, No. 06-579-GPM, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
17106, at *1-3, *5 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 2007), vacated on other grounds, 
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530 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 2008) (County of Monroe: county in Illinois, 
property owner; Gene Taake: individual, buyer; Taake argued 
acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
6. Jada Toys, Inc. v. Chi. Import, Inc., No. 07C699, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 85443, at *4, *6, *13-14, *18-21 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2009) (Jada 
Toys; large manufacturer, contracts were Jada Toys’ invoices; 
Chicago Imports: toy seller; Jada Toys argued acceptance—Court 
held acceptance established). 
7. Nat’l Prod. Workers Union Ins. Trust v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 
05-cv-5415, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29582 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2010), 
aff’d, 665 F.3d 897 (7th Cir. 2011) (Life Insurance Co.; insurance 
company, drafted policy; National Production Workers Union 
Insurance Trust: trust jointly set up by large union and employers 
with collective bargaining agreements with union; Workers Union 
argued acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
8. Carroll v. Stryker Corp., 670 F. Supp. 2d 891, 894, 897-898 (W.D. Wis. 
2009), aff’d, 658 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2010) (Stryker Corp: corporation, 
employer, drafted contract; Carroll: employee; Stryker Corp. argued 
acceptance—Court held acceptance established). 
9. Sys. Dev. Integration, LLC v. Computer Scis. Corp., 739 F. Supp. 2d 
1063, 1070-1071, 1080-1081 (N.D. Ill.2010) (Computer Science Corp: 
general contractor, technical expertise; System Development 
Integration: subcontractor, technical expertise; System Development 
argued acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
10. Catapult Commc’n Corp. v. Foster, No. 06C6112, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94922, at *2, *8, *16 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2010) (Catapult 
Communication Corp: corporation, employer; Lewis Foster: 
employee; Foster argued acceptance—Court held no acceptance 
established). 
11. Fiduciary Real Estate Dev., Inc. v. Goodavage, 2011 Wisc. App. 
LEXIS 1023 at *1, 4-6 (Dec. 22, 2011) (Fiduciary Real Estate Dev.: 
corporation, lessor; Diana Goodavage: tenant; Goodavage argued 
acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
12. Claire’s Stores, Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., No. 11 CV 2463, 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30477, at *1-3, *20, *27 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 
2012) (Companion Ins. Co.: insurance company, drafted policy; 
Claire’s Stores: national retailer; Claire’s argued acceptance—Court 
held no acceptance established). 
13. U.S. CFTC v. Tunney & Assocs., No. 13 CV 2919, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 123124, at *2, *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) (US Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission: federal agency; Tunney & Associates: 
CPA firm; Tunney argued no acceptance—Court held acceptance 
established). 
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Weaker Party (10) 
1. Compton Unified Sch. Dist. v. Universal Constr. Maint. Integration 
Co., B144260, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4696, at *2, *15-16 
(Jan. 22, 2002) (Universal Construction: general contractor; 
Compton Unified: public school system, public works owner; 
Compton Unified argued acceptance—Court held no acceptance 
established). 
2. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. v. Jet Messenger Serv., 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25421, at *1-3, *14-16 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2003) (Jet 
Messenger: for-hire courier service; R.R. Donnelly: larger company, 
management services provider, developed system; RR Donnelly 
argued acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
3. Bennett v. Broderick, 858 N.E.2d 1044, 1046, 1048-1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2006) (Brian Bennet: tenant; Carole Broderick: property owner, 
landlord, provided lease agreement; Broderick argued no 
acceptance—Court held acceptance established). 
4. U.S. ex rel. Countryside Indus. v. Integrated Constr. Tech. Corp., No. 
07CV2633, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76008, at *2-4, *7-8, *11 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 28, 2007) (Countryside Indus: landscaping subcontractor; 
Integrated Constr.: joint venture, general contractors; Countryside 
argued acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
5. 737 N. Mich. Ave. Investors LLC v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., No. 
06C6379, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26079, at *1-2, *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 
5, 2007) (Neiman Marcus: national retailer, tenant; 737 N. Mich. Ave 
Investors: property owner, landlord, sole member of LLC is Aetna 
Life Ins. Co.; 737 Investors argued no acceptance—Court held 
acceptance established). 
6. Ind. BMV v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 362, 365-366 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2008) (Ash, Inc.; landlord, property owner; Indiana BMV: state 
agency; Indiana BMV argued no acceptance—Court held acceptance 
established). 
7. Stopka v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 10C6034, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 113713, at *2-3, *7-8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2011) (Stopkas: 
husband and wife, homeowners; American Family: insurance 
company; Stopkas argued acceptance—Court held acceptance 
established). 
8. Bear Dev., LLC v. City of Kenosha, 822 F. Supp. 2d 865, 867, 870-871 
(E.D. Wis. 2011) (Bear Development: developer; City of Kenosha & 
Redevelopment AuthorIty: land owner, drafted contract, 
government entity; Bear Development argued acceptance—Court 
held acceptance established). 
9. Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Group, LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d 770, 773, 
777-778 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (Carole Van Tassell et al: online 
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shoppers/consumers; United Marketing, Pikes Peak Direct 
Marketing, et al: online retailers and marketers; Van Tassell argue no 
acceptance—Court held no acceptance established). 
10. Mitchell v. Mitchell, Nos. 2-13-0303 & 2-13-0363, cons., 2013 Ill. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 2619, at ¶ 4, ¶ 27, ¶ 35 (Nov. 20, 2013) (Mary 
Mitchell: wife, worked part-time during marriage, unemployed; Curt 
Mitchell: managing director, portfolio director, partner for an 




1. Falconbridge U.S., Inc. v. Bank One Ill., N.A., 227 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 
2000) (mining company versus a bank). 
2. Bennett v. Truttman, No. H024877, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1648 (Feb. 24, 2004) (buyers and sellers are both husband and wife). 
3. Finnin v. Bob Lindsay, Inc., 852 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (both 
parties represented by attorneys, Bob Lindsay is a car dealership and 
corporation but buyers have the money to buy the car dealership). 
4. Estate of Mueller v. Karns, 873 N.E.2d 652 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) 
(Estate: property owner versus Karns: expertise). 
5. Knight v. Kadish, No. 1:05-cv-0077-TAB-RLY, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47133 (S.D. Ind. June 28, 2007) (Kadish owns property but both are 
individuals, both in business, both represented by attorneys). 
6. L.B. Foster Co. v. Tie & Track Sys., No. 07C3692, 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26962 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2009) (both are companies, not a lot 
of facts about either). 
 
Modification (Total Cases = 22) 
 
Stronger Party (11) 
1. Henthorne v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc., 764 N.E.2d 751, 754, 758-759 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (Legacy Healthcare: cross-claim plaintiff, 
owner/operator of 10+ nursing homes; Sunshine Rehab Services: 
cross-claim defendant, rehab service provider; Legacy argued 
modification valid—Court held modification valid). 
2. Carnes Co. v. Stone Creek Mech., Inc., 412 F.3d 845, 848, 850-853 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (Carnes Co.: HVAC manufacturer, technical expertise re 
goods being sold, invoices were basis of contract; Stone Creek: 
mechanical contractor; Stone Creek argued modification not valid—
Court held modification valid). 
3. Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154, 155-156, 161 (Ind. 2005) 
(Bank One: national bank; John Sees: guarantor; Sees argued 
modification valid—Court held modification not valid). 
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4. Leavitt v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., No. 04 C 7451, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13004, at *1, *16, *27, *31 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007). (John 
Hancock: life insurance company, drafted policy; Carol Leavitt: 
third-party beneficiary; Leavitt argued modification valid—Court 
held modification not valid). 
5. Zusy v. Int’l Med. Group, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1089, 1091, 1093 
(S.D. Ind. 2007) (International Media Group: employer, corporation; 
Jonathan Zusy: employee, vice president, general counsel; Zusy 
argued modification valid—Court held modification not valid). 
6. Hal Wagner Studios, Inc. v. Elliott, No. 09-CV-0031-MJR, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8892, at *1, *4, *21-29 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 19, 2009). (Hal 
Wagner: corporation, employer; Kris Elliot: employee; Elliot argued 
modification not valid—Court held modification valid). 
7. Genzyme Corp. v. Disc. Drugs Wis., Inc., No. 08 C 5151, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18356, at *1-2, *10, *14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010) (Abbot 
Labs: third-party defendant, large pharmaceutical manufacturer and 
marketer; Discount Drugs Wisconsin: third party plaintiff; drug store; 
Abbot Labs argued modification not valid—Court held modification 
not valid). 
8. Acevedo v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 11 C 4877, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
106461, at *1-2, *5-6, *18-19 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2012) (CitiMortgage: 
large mortgage company, lender; Hector Acevedo & Juanita 
Bermudez: homeowners/borrowers; CitiMortgage argued no breach 
of contract to modify loan—Court held no breach of contract, no 
agreement to modify). 
9. Williams v. TCF Nat’l Bank, No. 12 C 05115, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28074, at *1-3, *16 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2013). (TCF National Bank: 
national bank; Cindy Williams: account holder; TCF moved to 
compel arbitration—Court granted motion to compel arbitration 
after finding valid contract modification that included arbitration 
clause). 
10. McGann v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 11-CV-06894, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46484, at *1-2, *5, *14, *17-18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2013). (PNC 
Bank: bank/lender; Virginia McGann: homeowner/borrower; PNC 
Bank argued no breach of contract to modify loan—Court held no 
breach of contract, no agreement to modify). 
11. Baehl v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-00029-RLY-WGH, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46445, at *1-2, *28, *33 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2013) 
(Bank of America: national bank/lender; Michael & Jerri Baehl: 
homeowners/borrowers; Baehls argued breach of contract to modify 
loan—Court held no breach of contract, no agreement to modify). 
 
Weaker Party (7) 
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1. Cloud Corp. v. Hasbro, Inc., 314 F.3d 289, 291-292, 294, 298 (7th Cir. 
2002) (Cloud Corp: toy seller; Hasbro, Inc.: really large toy 
manufacturer; Cloud Corp. argued modification valid—Court held 
modification valid). 
2. AT&T Corp. v. Douglas-Hanson Co., No. 05-C-266-S, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24801, at *1-2, *11 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 21, 2005) (Douglas-
Hanson Co.: customer; AT&T: large telecommunications provider; 
AT&T argued modification valid—Court held modification not 
valid). 
3. Grogg v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 1:05-CV-415 TS, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51662, at *1-2, *10-11 (N.D. Ind. July 13, 2006). 
(Lisa Grogg et al: injured parties; Auto Owners Ins. Co.: intervening 
defendant, insurance company; Auto Owners argued modification 
valid—Court held modification not valid). 
4. Fritsch v. Premier Investors, LLC, 2006 Wisc. App. LEXIS 452, at *1-
2, *4, *5-6 (May 23, 2006) (John & Judith Fritsch: husband and wife, 
buyers; Premier Investors: company, seller, property owner; Premier 
argued modification not valid—Court held modification valid). 
5. Ind. BMV v. Ash, Inc., 895 N.E.2d 359, 362, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) 
Ash, Inc.; landlord, property owner; Indiana BMV: state agency; 
Indiana BMV argued modification not valid—Court held 
modification valid). 
6. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 554, 560, 565 (7th Cir. 
2012) (Lori Wigod: homeowner/borrower; Wells Fargo: national 
bank, lender; Wells Fargo argued breach of contract to offer 
permanent modification—Court held sufficient breach of contract 
alleged to survive motion to dismiss). 
7. Silverado Group, LLC v. Ed’s Towing, Inc., No. 2-12-0629, 2012 IL 
App (2d) 120629-U, ¶ 2, ¶¶ 4-5 (Dec. 24, 2012) (LEXIS) (Ed’s 
Towing: buyer; Silverado Group: assignee of Chicago Leasing Corp., 
property owner, drafted contract; Ed’s Towing argued modification 
valid—Court held modification valid). 
 
Undesignated (4) 
1. DiMizio v. Romo, 756 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (both parties 
are husband and wife, both own pizza restaurants). 
2. Royster-Clark, Inc. v. Olsen’s Mill, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 2006) 
(both parties are corporations, not enough facts on either). 
3. Urban Sites of Chi., LLC v. Crown Castle USA, 979 N.E.2d 480 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2012) (not enough facts). 
4. Large v. Mobile Tool Int’l, Inc., 724 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2013) (both 
parties are companies, not enough facts on either). 
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Duress (Total Cases = 10) 
 
Stronger Party (8) 
1. Flynn v. AerChem, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1057-1058, 1061-1062 
(S.D. Ind. 2000) AerChem; corporation, employer, drafted the 
contract; Flynn: employee; Flynn argued duress—Court held duress 
not established). 
2. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 382, 385-87 (7th Cir. 2000) (Owen 
Rissman: majority shareholder; Arnold Rissman: minority 
shareholder; Arnold Rissman argued duress—Court held duress not 
established). 
3. McBride v. St. Anthony Messenger Magazine, No. 2:02-CV-0237-JDT-
WTL, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6449, at *3, *20-22 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 
2003). St. Anthony: businesses, magazine publisher; John & Laurie 
McBride: husband and wife, magazine solicitors; McBrides argued 
duress—Court held duress not established). 
4. In re Pre-Press Graphics Co., 310 B.R. 905, 909, 916, 919 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2004) (Pre-Press Graphics: corporation; employer; David Azarla: 
employee; Azarla argued duress—Court held duress not 
established). 
5. Cozen O’Connor, P.C. v. Asperger Caraher LLC, No. 05 C 5624, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81112, at *4-6, *19-22 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2006). 
(Cozen O’Connor: still in existence law firm, got some of Asperger’s 
clients; Asperger Caraher: dissolved law firm; Asperger Caraher 
argued duress—Court held duress not established). 
6. United States v. Fletcher, No. 06 C 6056, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3555, 
at *1-2, *9-10, *31-33 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2008), aff’d, 562 F.3d 839 (7th 
Cir. 2009). (United States/IRS: federal government agency; Michael 
& Cynthia Fletcher: husband/wife, taxpayers, wife is partner at 
accounting firm; Fletchers argued duress—Court held duress not 
established). 
7. ChampionsWorld LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 961, 
964, 973-974 (N.D. Ill. 2010). (U.S. Soccer Federation: governing 
body and professional soccer league; Championsworld: business, 
sponsored pro soccer events; Champions World argued duress—
Court held duress not established). 
8. Jackson v. Payday Fin., LLC, No. 11 C 9288, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
94095, at *1-4, *8 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 2012), rev’d and remanded on 
other grounds, 764 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2014) (Payday: one of many 
companies owned by individual defendant Martin Webb; Jackson et 
al: 3 Illinois consumers; Webb argued duress—Court held duress not 
established). 
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Weaker Party (1) 
 
1. Putz v. Allie, 785 N.E.2d 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (Allie: girlfriend, 
worked in plaintiff’s store for no pay during 11 year relationship; 
Putz: boyfriend, jewelry store owner; Putz argued duress—Court 
held duress not established). 
 
Undesignated (1) 
1. Krilich v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 778 N.E.2d 1153 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2002) (counterclaim parties: Krilich and Bongi Development Corp, 
Bongi is real estate developer but Krilich is part of joint venture 
involving a lot of land). 
 
Impracticability (Total Cases = 12) 
 
Stronger Party (5) 
1. Days Inn of Am., Inc. v. Patel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 928, 930, 933-934 (C.D. 
Ill. 2000) (Days Inn: national hotel chain, franchisor; Ishwaral Patel: 
franchisee; Patel argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
2. Brenner v. Greenberg, No. 08 C 826, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120614, at 
*1-3, *17 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 2010) (Greenberg & Weber: defendants, 
property owner and developer; Steven Brenner: developer; Brenner 
argued impracticability—Court held impracticability not 
established). 
3. Prospect Enters., L.L.C. v. Ruff, No. 10-1026, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74099, at *1-5, *16, *19 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2011). (Prospect 
Enterprises: condo development owner; Donald & Annette Ruff: 
husband/wife, buyers; Ruffs argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
4. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Shelbourne Dev. Grp., Inc., No. 09 C 4963, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21258, at *1-2, *5, *12, *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 
2011) (Bank of America: large national bank, lender; Shelbourne 
Development Group: borrower; Shelbourne argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability not established). 
5. Howard Johnson Int’l, Inc. v. M.D.1, LLC, No. 11 C 2593, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 151223, at *1-3, *7, *8-9 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2012) 
(Howard Johnson: national hotel chain, licensor; M.D.1: licensee; 
M.D.1. argued impracticability—Court held impracticability not 
established). 
 
Weaker Party (3) 
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1. Contempo Design, Inc. v. Chic. & Ne. Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 
226 F.3d 535, 540, 545-546 (7th Cir. 2000) (Contempo Designs: 
business that employs carpenters; Chicago Carpenters: carpenters’ 
union; Chicago Carpenters argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
2. Ner Tamid Congregation of N. Town v. Krivoruchko, No. 08 C 1261, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58318, *1-2, *27, *49, *59 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 
2009) (Ner Tamid: non-profit organization; Igor Krivoruchko: real 
estate developer, lots of fact re his holdings and expertise; 
Krivoruchko argued impracticability—Court held impracticability 
not established). 
3. BRC Rubber & Plastics v. Cont’l Carbon Co., 949 F. Supp. 2d 862, 
864, 875, 877 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (BRC Rubber: rubber and plastic 
products manufacturer, buyer of carbon black, “small customer”; 
Continental Carbon: manufacturer of carbon black, seller, large 
supplier; Continental Carbon argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
 
Undesignated (4) 
1. Sub-Zero Freezer Co. v. Cunard Line Ltd., No. 01-C-0664-C, 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27142 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 12, 2002). (both large 
corporations). 
2. Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. NRG Energy, Inc., No. 03 C 2265, 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18830 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2004) (both parties are 
corporations, not a lot of facts on either). 
3. Exelon Generation Co. v. Gen. Atomics Techs. Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 
892 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (both parties are corporations, not a lot of facts 
on either). 
4. Lawrence Crawford Ass’n v. Conversource, Inc., No. 5-11-0061, 2012 
Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1966 (Aug. 15, 2012) (not enough facts re 
either party). 
 
Hart_23 (Dukanovic) 8/27/2015 9:57 PM 
 
Appendix 7: Prevailing Parties by Doctrine—9th Circuit 
 
Offer (Total Cases = 15) 
 
Stronger Party (9) 
1. Saluteen-Maschersky v. Countrywide Funding Corp., 22 P.3d 804, 805-
07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (Countrywide: mortgage company; Peter 
Saluteen-Maschersky: borrower; Saluteen-Maschersky argued 
offer—Court held offer not established). 
2. Sarafa v. PC Quote, Inc., No. D036652, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1229, at *1, *17, *29 (Nov. 28, 2001) (PC Quote: internet provider re 
financial market data, corporation; Anthony Sarafa: computer 
software developer; PC Quote argued no offer—Court held offer not 
established). 
3. Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 47 P.3d 1222, 1226, 1236 (Haw. 
2002) (Cutter Dodge: corporation, car dealership; Zanakis-Pico: 
customers; Zanakis-Pico argued offer—Court held offer not 
established).  
4. Andrus v. Wash. Dep't of Transp., 117 P.3d 1152, 1153-54 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2005) (Washington Dept. of Transportation: state agency, 
employer; Scott Andrus: employee; Andrus argued offer—Court 
held offer not established). 
5. Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1198, 1205 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Capital One: bank-card issuer; Raquel Rubio: card-holder; Rubio 
argued offer—Court held offer not established).  
6. Laguerre v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 3:10-CV-452-ECR-VPC, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131100, at *1-2, *9-10 (D. Nev. Dec. 9, 2010) 
(Nevada System: state agency, employer; Jowel Laguerre: employee; 
Laguerre argued offer—Court held offer not established).  
7. Holland v. BP Am., Inc., No. CIV S-11-0580-KJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30204, at *1, *16, *18 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012) (BP America: 
very big, international oil company; Scott Holland: individual that 
responded to an ad to devise a solution to oil spill; Holland argued 
offer—Court held offer not established). 
8. Frezza v. Google Inc., No. 5:12-CV-00237-RMW, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 57462, at *2, *8, *10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2013) (Google: giant 
internet service provider, etc.; Rachel Frezza & Mauro Rodriguez: 
merchants, Google customers; Frezza argued offer—Court held offer 
not established).  
9. Cheren v. Compass Bank, No. CV-12-00206-PHX-JAT, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 118804, at *1-2, *11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2013) (Compass 
Bank: bank, lender; David & Catherine Cheren: husband/wife, 
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homeowners, borrowers; Cherens argued offer—Court held offer not 
established). 
 
Weaker Party (3) 
1. Donovan v. RRL Corp., 27 P.3d 702, 706, 818-20 (Cal. 2001) (Brian 
Donovan: buyer; RRL Corp: corporation, car dealer; Donovan 
argued offer—Court held offer established). 
2. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. v. Exec. Risk Indem., Inc., No. C 06-2572 
SBA, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116080, at *2, *26 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 
2009) (S.J. Amoroso: construction company; Executive Risk: 
insurance company; Amoroso argued no acceptance—Court held 
acceptance not established). 
3. Ashbey v. Archstone Prop. Mgmt., No. SACV 12-0009 DOC, 2012 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *1, *16 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2012) 
(Michael Ashbey: employee; Archstone: property management 
company, employer; Archstone argued acceptance—Court held 
acceptance not established). 
 
Undesignated (3) 
1. Williams Bros. Construction, L.L.C. v. Baltrusch Inc., No. DV-01-101, 
2004 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3042 (2004) (both business entities but not 
enough facts to determine). 
2. Lexington Precision Corp. v. Autoliv Inc., No. 2 CA-CV 2005-0187, 
2006 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 434 (2006) (both corporations but 
not enough facts to determine). 
3. Amber Chem., Inc. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., No. 106CV06090OWWSMS, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14451 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (both corporations but 
not enough facts to determine). 
 
Acceptance (Total Cases = 24) 
 
Stronger Party (10) 
1. Hoseth v. Masonic Temple Ass’n, No. 19842-1-III, 2001 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2156, at*2, *7 (Sept. 27, 2001) (Masonic Temple: association, 
hired caterer; Sharon Hoseth: individual, caterer; Masonic Temple 
argued no acceptance—Court held acceptance not established). 
2. Valdez Fisheries Dev. Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 45 P.3d 657, 
662, 665-66 (Alaska 2002), remanded sub nom, Sea Hawk Seafoods, 
Inc. v. State, 215 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2009) (Alyeska: oil company; Sea 
Hawk Seafoods: (plaintiff) financially struggling food processor; 
Valdez argued acceptance—Court held acceptance not established). 
3. Ken Hood Constr. Co. v. Pac. Coast Constr., Inc., 120 P.3d 6, 7-8 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2005) (Pacific Coast: cross-claim plaintiff, general 
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contractor, more experience in field; Fong Holdings: cross-claim 
defendant, owner, developer with no experience prior to purchase of 
this property; Pacific Coast argued acceptance—Court held 
acceptance established). 
4. Beretta v. Tucson Trap & Skeet Club, No. 2 CA-CV 2007-0009, 2007 
Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1260, at *1-2, *7 (Aug. 16, 2007) (Tuscon 
Trap: business entity, employer; Dianna Beretta: employee; Beretta 
argued acceptance—Court held acceptance not established). 
5. Veith v. Xterra Wetsuits, L.L.C., 183 P.3d 334, 335-36 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2008) (UnclePDog: defendant, distributor; Cristi Veith: consumer; 
Veith argued acceptance—Court held acceptance not established). 
6. Attachmate Corp. v. Health Net, Inc., No. C09-1161 MJP, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114445, at *2, *8 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2010) 
(Attachmate: software manufacturer and distributor, expertise, 
drafted the EULA; Health Net: software buyer; Health Net argued 
no acceptance—Court held acceptance was established). 
7. Fuller v. Monogram Real Estate, No. G044514, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 9647, at *1, *13 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Monogram Real Estate: 
company that acquires real estate; Jerry Fuller: property owner, 
developer; Fuller argued acceptance—Court held acceptance not 
established). 
8. Nascimento v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 2:11-CV-1049 JCM (GWF), 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160301, at *1, *6 (D. Nev. Nov. 8, 2012) 
(Wells Fargo: large, national bank, lender; Joseph Nascimento: 
borrower; Wells Fargo argued no acceptance—Court held 
acceptance not established). 
9. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 282 P.3d 359, 362, 364-65 
(Alaska 2012) (City of Valdez: City; Sea Hawk Seafoods: owner of 
seafood processing facility; Sea Hawk argued acceptance—Court 
held acceptance not established). 
10. Duncan v. Lifelock, Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 12-0546, 2013 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 744, at *1, *8 (July 2, 2013) (Lifelock: corporation, 
employer; Neal Duncan: employee; Duncan argued acceptance—
Court held no acceptance). 
 
Weaker Party (6) 
1. Leon v. Sharp Health Care, No. D040042, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 4910, at *1, *4, *8 (May 20, 2003) (Melvina & Rafael Leon: 
injured parties; Sharp Health Care & Employee: company; Sharp 
Health argued no acceptance—Court held acceptance established). 
2. WMW L.L.C. v. Winton, No. B162872, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1590 (Feb. 23, 2004) (Zelda Winton: owner of property, seller; 
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WMW: buyer, business entity, business owners are lawyers; WMW 
argued acceptance—Court held acceptance not established). 
3. Gabriel v. Ailing House Pest Control, Inc., No. H029300, 2007 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 3454, at *2, *4, *16 (Apr. 30, 2007) (Larry 
Gabriel: homeowner, customer; Ailing House: pest control business; 
Ailing House argued acceptance—Court held acceptance not 
established). 
4. Castle v. Imagine Audio Video, L.L.C., No. 1 CA-CV 10-0427, 2011 
Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 781, at *2, *15, *18 (May 24, 2011) 
(Marshal &Luanne Castle: husband/wife, customer; Imagine Audio: 
business, technical expertise; Castles argued no acceptance—Court 
held acceptance not established). 
5. Lietz v. Hansen Law Offices, PSC, 271 P.3d 899, 902, 907 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2011) (Paul Lietz: employee; Hansen Law Offices: employer, 
lawyers; Lietz argued acceptance—Court held acceptance 
established). 
6. Arreola v. Napole, No. B239467, 2013 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7346, 
at *2, *9, *17 (Oct. 15, 2013) (Maria Arreola: injured party; World 
Express Tech: defendant, employer of driver that injured Arreola; 




1. Gray v. Stewart, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 217 (Ct. App. 2002) (one individual 
versus a husband and wife, both sides represented by counsel). 
2. Bennett v. Truttman, No. H024877, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1648 (Feb. 24, 2004) (both parties are husband and wife, one owns 
the property, one has money to purchase it, both represented by 
agents). 
3. Johnston v. Moreli, No. F046348, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4920 
(June 8, 2006) (two trusts, various business entities—broker has 
expertise, sellers own a shopping center). 
4. Earls v. Corning, 143 P.3d 243 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (decedent was 
elderly woman who owned property, defendants were husband and 
wife, not enough facts to determine). 
5. Shikwan Sung v. Hamilton, 676 F. Supp. 2d 990 (D. Haw. 2009) 
(defendants are a large property owner and business, but plaintiff has 
$2.9 million to purchase). 
6. Gardenias v. Candreva, No. B223556, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
1884 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2011) (two individuals both represented 
by attorneys). 
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7. Mills v. Budil, No. 41586-1-II, 2012 Wash. App. LEXIS 739 (Mar. 27, 
2012) (Budil is owner, but Mills is represented by son who is in 
business and participated in drafting the agreement). 
8. DC Media Capital v. Imagine Fulfillment Servs., No. B239081, 2013 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6256 (Aug. 30, 2013) (both companies, not 
enough facts to determine). 
 
Modification (Total Cases = 23) 
 
Stronger Party (16) 
1. Smith v. Solo Watersports, Inc., No. 49064-8-I, 2002 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 1811, at *2, *11 (July 29, 2002) (William Smith: lender (lent 
money to defendant start-ups); Solo Watersports: start-up; Solo 
argued modification valid—Court held modification not valid). 
2. Wessa v. Watermark Paddlesports, Inc., No. C06-5156 FDB, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 51757, at *1, *6-7 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2006) 
(Watermark: corporation, patent buyer; Scott & Kim Wessa: 
husband/wife, patent seller; Wessas argued modification valid—
Court held modification not valid). 
3. Womack v. Bank of Am., No. 1 CA-CV 07-0141, 2007 Ariz. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 909, at *1, *11, *15  (Nov. 20, 2007) (Bank of 
America: large, national bank, lender; Thomas & Deborah Womack: 
husband/wife, borrowers; Womacks argued modification valid—
Court held modification not valid). 
4. Flores v. Jewels Mktg. & Agribusiness, No. CIV F 07-334 AWI WMW, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53127, at *2-3, *25 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2007) 
(Jewel Marketing: bigger company, marketer, sellers; Joe Flores & 
M&G Farms: growers; Flores argued modification not valid—Court 
held modification valid). 
5. Evans v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. 2:09-cv-02401-RLH-LRL, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 63410 12, at *1, *12-13 (D. Nev. June 18, 2010) (Aurora 
Loan: lender; Michael Evans: homeowner, borrower; Evans argued 
bank acted in bad faith with respect to his modification process—
Court held modification not established). 
6.  Barinaga v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1168 (D. 
Or. 2010) (JP Morgan: big national bank, lender; Kristin Barinaga: 
homeowner, borrower; Barinaga argued modification valid—Court 
held modification not valid). 
7. Morales v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 10-02068 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 49698, at *5, *12, *17 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (Chase & JP 
Morgan: home loan servicer and big national bank, lender; Herminia 
Morales: homeowner, borrower; Morales argued breach of contract 
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for loan modification—Court held no breach of contract, no 
agreement to modify).  
8. FDIC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. SACV 10-0713 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94842, at *1, *10-11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011) 
(FDIC: federal government agency; First American: title insurance 
company; First American argued modification valid—Court held 
modification not valid). 
9. Ahmed v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B227388, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8055, at *2-3, *11 (Oct. 24, 2011) (Wells Fargo: big national 
bank, lender; Khaleda Ahmed: homeowner, borrower; Ahmed 
argued modification valid—Court held modification not valid). 
10. Nungaray v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 444, 
447 (Ct. App. 2011) (subsequent history omitted) (Litton Loan & 
Bank of America: loan servicing company, big national bank, lender; 
Ruben & Dora Nungaray: husband/wife, homeowners, borrowers; 
Nungarays argued breach of contract to offer modification—Court 
held no breach of contract, no agreement to modify). 
11. Soin v. Fannie Mae, No. CIV. 2:12-634 WBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
51824, at *1, *15 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2012) (Fannie Mae & Suntrust 
Mortgage: mortgage company, federal mortgage association, lenders; 
Romesh & Alma Soin: husband/wife, homeowners, borrowers; Soins 
argued breach of contract to offer modification—Court held no 
breach of contract, no agreement to modify). 
12. Mulville v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B237831, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 8285, at *2, *29 (Nov. 14, 2012) (Wells Fargo: big national 
bank; Duane & Beverly Mulville: husband/wife, homeowners, 
borrowers; Mulvilles argued modification valid—Court held 
modification not valid). 
13. Juarez v. Suntrust Mortg., No. CV F 13-0485 LJO SAB, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67850 , at *2, *42, *46 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2013) 
(Suntrust: mortgage company, lender; Adan and Roas Juarez: 
husband/wife, homeowners, borrowers; Juarezes argued breach of 
contract to provide a modification—Court held no breach of 
contract, no agreement to modify). 
14. Toneman v. U.S. Bank, No. CV 12-09369-MMM (MRWx), 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 84240, at *7, *19-20 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (US Bank 
as Trustee & Wells Fargo Bank: big national banks, lenders; David & 
Kelly Toneman: husband/wife, homeowners, borrowers; Tonemans 
argued modification valid—Court held modification not valid). 
15. Graybill v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. C 12-05802 LB, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 34322, at *2, *31, *37-39 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2013) (Wells 
Fargo: big national bank, lender; John & Patricia Graybill: 
husband/wife, homeowners, borrowers; Graybills argued breach of 
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contract to offer modification—Court held no breach of contract, no 
agreement to modify). 
16. Dragicevich v. Chase Home Fin., No. CV 12-8192 ABC (MANx), 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112208, at *2, *4, *11 (C.D. Cal. July 8, 2013) 
(Chase: loan servicer, lender; Vera Dragicevich: homeowner, 
borrower; Chase argued no modification—Court held no 
modification). 
Weaker Party (4) 
1. Shea v. Household Bank (SB), 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387, 388, 390 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (James Shea: credit card holder; Household Bank: credit 
card issuer; Household Bank argued valid modification—Court held 
modification not valid). 
2. AAA Constr. of Missoula v. Choice Land Corp., 264 P.3d 709, 712, 714 
(Mont. 2011) (AAA Construction: subcontractor; Wayne Company: 
defendant, general contractor, control of property and project; 
Wayne Company argued modification valid—Court held 
modification not valid). 
3. Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Ct. App. 
2012) (Divinia Barroso: homeowner, borrower; Ocwen Loan: loan 
servicer, lender; Barroso argued modification valid—Court held 
modification claim survives motion to dismiss). 
4. Goodman v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. B243614, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 789, at *2, *16-17 (Jan. 30, 2014) (Coby Goodman: 
homeowner, borrower; Wells Fargo: big national bank; Goodman 
argued breach of contract to provide modification—Court held 
breach of contract claim survives motion to dismiss). 
 
Undesignated (3) 
1. Gillani Consulting Inc. v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., No. C05-
0823-JCC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88704 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 7, 2006), 
aff’d, 300 F. App’x 466 (9th. Cir. 2008) (both parties are 
corporations, both have expertise). 
2. Dragt v. Dragt/DeTray, LLC, 161 P.3d 473 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) 
(landowner versus technical expertise and money). 
3. Sociedad Aeronautica De, Santander S.A. v. Weber, No. CV 09-103-
M-DWM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71349 (D. Mont. July 14, 2010) (no 
facts regarding the parties). 
 
Duress (Total Cases = 16) 
 
Stronger Party (12) 
1. Morrow v. Am. Int'l Grp., No. B144474, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. 
LEXIS 3120, at *1-2, *24-25 (Mar. 13, 2002) (American: four 
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companies + one insurance company; Morrow: law firm; Morrow 
argued duress—Court held duress not established). 
2. Yemen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. B144230, 2002 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 2181, at *1, *4-5 (Apr. 11, 2002) (Countrywide: 
corporation, employer; Yemen: employee; Yemen argued duress—
Court held duress not established). 
3. Dodi v. Am. Online, Inc., No. B158161, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
4085, at *2, *12, *17 (Apr. 24, 2003) (AOL: corporation, employer; 
Dodi: female, employee; Dodi argued duress—Court held duress not 
established). 
4. Smith v. Rosenberg, No. E034199, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
6189, at *1-2, *12, *18 (June 29, 2004) (Nathan Rosenberg et al: 
lawyer & firm; Kathleen Smith: client; Smith argued duress—Court 
held duress not established). 
5. Namdar v. Koop, No. G032726, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2087, 
at *1-2, *30, *32 (Mar. 8, 2005) (Koop & Leventhal: trustor, trustee, 
note holder; Namdar: property owner, borrower, in financial trouble; 
Namdar argued duress—Court held duress not established). 
6. S & W Seed Co. v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., No. F043771, 2005 Cal. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 11723, at *1-3 (Dec. 20, 2005) (Mutual 
Casualty: insurance company; S&W Seed: farmers; S&W argued 
duress—Court held duress not established). 
7. Perez v. Uline, Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 873, 876-77 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(Uline: corporation, employer; Brian Perez: employee; Perez argued 
duress—Court held duress not established). 
8. Murray v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, No. A117596, 2008 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 7864, at *1, *15 (Sept. 15, 2008) (United Services: 
corporation, employer; Murray/McLorg: employees; Murray argued 
duress—Court held duress not established). 
9. Insitu, Inc. v. Kent, No. CV-08-3067-EFS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
61190, at *2, *11-12 (E.D. Wash. June 17, 2009), aff’d, 388 F. App'x 
745 (9th Cir. 2010) (Insitu: corporation, employer; Kent: vice 
president, chief financial officer, treasurer; Kent argued duress—
Court held duress not established). 
10. Chan v. Lund, 116 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 125, 133-34 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(Lund et al: husband/wife, property owners plus the tree contractor; 
Chan: property owner; Chan argued duress—Court held duress not 
established). 
11. Mortensen v. First Am. Title Co., No. 2:11-CV-0063-EJL, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43797, at *1-2, *24 (D. Idaho Mar. 25, 2013) (First 
American Title: title company; Marti Mortensen: married woman 
getting divorce after 25 years, husband did deals using First 
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American title; Mortensen argued duress—Court held duress not 
satisfied). 
12. Scooter's Pals Rescue v. Cnty. of Placer, No. 2:12–cv–01736–TLN–
KLN, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157819, at*2, *13 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 
2013) (County: government; Scooter’s: dog rescue organization; 
Scooter’s argued duress—Court held duress not established). 
 
Weaker Party (1) 
1. Flower v. Pep Boys, No. D040667, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
8095, at *1-3  (Aug. 26, 2003) (Flower: individual, customer; Pep 
Boys: car parts & service company, seller, technical expertise; Flower 
argued duress—Court held duress established). 
 
Undesignated (3) 
1. Goodman v. Lothrop, 151 P.3d 818 (Idaho 2007) (both parties are land 
owners, both are represented by counsel). 
2. Steinman v. Malamed, 111 Cal. Rptr. 3d 304 (Ct. App. 2010) (not 
enough facts to designate). 
3. In re Moonlight Basin Ranch LP, No. 09-62327-11, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 
2198 (Bankr. Dist. Mont. June 25, 2010) (both sides are big business, 
negotiations took months, both sides represented by counsel). 
 
Impracticability (Total Cases = 24) 
 
Stronger Party (13) 
1. Gravel Express, Inc. v. Meadow Valley Contrs., 232 F.3d 894, at *1 
(9th Cir. 2000) (Meadow Valley: general contractor; Gravel Express: 
subcontractor; Gravel Express argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
2. Evans v. Spokane, 112 Wash. App. LEXIS 2501, at *1, *6-7 (Aug. 6, 
2002) (Spokane: County, government, buyer; Evans: family 
businesses, property owner, seller; Spokane argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability established). 
3. Carsh v. Chaparral Pines, L.L.C., No. 2 CA-CV 2002-0175, 2003 Ariz. 
App. Unpub. LEXIS 59, at *1-2, *11-13 (Aug. 4, 2003) (Chaparral: 
real estate developer, Harry & Gwen Carsh: husband/wife, buyers; 
Carshes argued impracticability—Court held impracticability not 
established). 
4. OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Communs., Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 
1215-16, 1225 (D. Haw. 2003) (OWBR: large property owner, part of 
large Hawaii hotel chain, drafted contract, contract negotiated with 
defendant subsidiary; Clear Channel & Subsidiary: music conference 
HART_23 (DUKANOVIC) 8/27/2015 9:57 PM 
 
organizers; OWBR argued impracticability to prevent discharge—
Court held discharge denied—impracticability not established). 
5. Lockheed Martin Idaho Techs. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Advanced 
Envtl. Sys., No. CIV. 98-0316-E-BLW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24460, 
at *7, 30 (D. Idaho Oct. 29, 2004) (Lockheed Martin Idaho Techs: 
management and operations contractor for government radioactive 
waste site, government backed; Lockheed Martin Advanced: 
hazardous waste subcontractor; Lockheed Martin Advanced argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability not established). 
6. Coll. of the Sequoias Farm v. White Gold Ass'n, No. 1:07-CV-00014 
AWINEW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49315, at *4, *35, *43 (E.D. Cal. 
July 6, 2007) (White Gold: professional associations, marketers, 
distributors; College of Sequoias: cotton growers; College of 
Sequoias argued impracticability—Court held impracticability not 
established). 
7. Habitat Trust for Wildlife, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga, 96 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 813, 823-24, 843 (Ct. App. 2009) (Henderson Creek 
Properties/SPS Development/Granite: real party in interest, property 
owner, developer; Habitat: conservation organization; Henderson 
Creek argued impracticability—Court held impracticability 
established). 
8. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Ash Org., No. 09-CV-188-MO, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 66542, at *3, *17-19 (D. Or. July 1, 2010) (Wells Fargo: 
big national bank; Ash: commercial loan borrower; Ash argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability not established). 
9. Max Baer Prods., Ltd. v. Riverwood Partners, LLC, No. 309-CV-
00512-RCJRAM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100325, at *1, *10 (D. Nev. 
Sept. 17, 2010) (Riverwood: property owner, seller, developer; Max 
Baer: buyer; Max Baer argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
10. M & I Bank, FSB v. Coughlin, No. CV 09-02282-PHX-NVW, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130638, at *3-4, *19-21 (D. Ariz. Nov. 9, 2011) 
(M&I: bank, lender; Lawyers Title Ins: defendant, title company; 
Lawyers Title argued impracticability—Court held impracticability 
not established). 
11. Bean v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., No. 11-CV-553-PHX-
GMS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 476, at *1, *14-15 (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 
2012) (BAC: lender, loan servicer; Cecilia Bean: homeowner, 
borrower; Bean argued impracticability—Court held impracticability 
not established). 
12. Reader v. BAC Home Loan Servicing LP, No. CV 11-02461-PHX-
FJM, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4899, at *2, *13 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2012), 
aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom, 582 F. App'x 719 
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(9th Cir. 2014) (BAC: lender, loan servicer; Helen Reader: 
homeowner, borrower; Reader argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
13. Babcock v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., No. 12-CV-5093-TOR, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1035, at *3, *9-11 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2013) (ING: 
insurance company; Rudolph Babcock: insured; ING argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability established). 
 
Weaker Party (6) 
1. Ploegman v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 112 Wash. App. 1001, 
at *1-3 (Jun. 3, 2002) (Ploegman: family members, injured parties; 
Santa Fe Railway: large railroad company; Ploegman argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability established). 
2. Nielsen Bros. v. Solid Trading, Ltd., No. 52535-2-I, 2004 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2769, at *2, *9-10 (Nov. 15, 2004) (Nielsen Bros: buyers; Solid 
Trading: property owner, seller, had attorney review document 
before signing; Solid Trading argued impracticability—Court held 
impracticability not established). 
3. Dalkilic v. Titan Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1180-81, 1197-98 (S.D. 
Cal. 2007) (Savas Dalkilic & Tuncay Celek: employees, Turkish 
interpreters; Titan Corp. & SOS International: corporations, 
government contractors, employers; Titan Corp. argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability not established). 
4. United States v. Pflueger, No. CR 10-00631-02 LEK, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 46784, at *3, *8, *13 (D. Haw. June 27, 2007) (James 
Pflueger, Pflueger Properties: business, property owner; USA & 
Dept of Heath, State of Hawaii: government, government agency; 
Pflueger argued impracticability—Court held impracticability 
established). 
5. Manay v. Academic Exch., No. C07-5071 RBL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30531, at *2, *15-16 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2008) (Jorge Manay & 
International Travellers Assistance: foreign student exchange 
company; Academic Exchange of America: U.S. based foreign 
student exchange company; Academic Exchange argued 
impracticability—Court held impracticability not established). 
6. Cabela's Retail, Inc. v. Hawks Prairie Inv., LLC, No. 11-CV-5973-
RBL, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85776, at *3, *33-34 (W.D. Wash. June 
18, 2013) (Hawks Prairie: “small community development company”; 
Cabela’s: national chain; Cabela’s argued impracticability—Court 
held impracticability not established). 
 
Undesignated (5) 
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1. Cape-France Enters v. In re Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001) 
(both parties worked through same real estate agent, one is owner of 
property, one has money to purchase). 
2. Peoplesoft U.S.A., Inc. v. Softeck, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (both parties are corporations, not enough facts to 
determine). 
3. Landover Corp. v. Bellevue Master, LLC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1845 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 6, 2006), aff'd, 252 F. App'x 800 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(condominium developer versus Coldwell Banker, not enough facts 
to designate). 
4. Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. City of Glendale, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
68112 (D. Or. May 22, 2009), report and recommendation adopted in 
part, rejected in part, No. CIV.05-1321-PK, 2009 WL 2170507 (D. Or. 
July 15, 2009) (a city versus a public utility company). 
5. Aleut Enter., LLC v. Adak Seafood, LLC, No. 3:10-CV-0017-RRB, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92132 (D. Ala. Sept. 2, 2010) (no facts re the 
companies). 
